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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The traditional view of for-profit corporations has been that they exist
primarily to serve their shareholders and, more specifically, to maximize the
value of the shareholders’ investment in the corporation.
1
This norm, often
referred to as the shareholder primacy theory or norm,
2
has been the
1. See Dan Pontefract, Should Companies Serve Only Their Shareholders Or Their
Stakeholders More Broadly?, FORBES (May 9, 2016, 11:31 AM), https://www.for
bes.com/sites/danpontefract/2016/05/09/shareholders-or-stakeholders/#3a54e1b013d2
(citing the mission statements of numerous organizations that state that their primary
purpose is to work for the benefit of their shareholders, but also noting a recent trend
toward the use of the term “stakeholder” which refers to all parties whose support is so
necessary that the organization would cease to exist without them). Business entities can
take any number of forms, including limited liability companies or partnerships. Because
this article includes an analysis of state corporation law statutes, only incorporated
business entities will be discussed herein. Many other legal principles discussed in this
article, including those relating to state and federal anti-discrimination laws, would apply
to limited liability companies, partnerships and other business entities as well.
2. See infra pp. 301–10.
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dominant theory since the earliest days of corporation statutes. While state
corporation statutes have not expressly enumerated maximizing shareholder
value as the primary objective of corporations, the actions of corporate
directors and supporting caselaw in relevant states have repeatedly affirmed
that corporations exist for the primary objective of benefitting their
shareholders.
In recent years, however, other constituencies, including employees, local
governments, environmental advocates and social welfare organizations
have succeeded in making claims that they, as non-shareholder stakeholders
in corporations, should also be considered when the governing bodies of
corporations make decisions on how the corporation operates and whose
concerns should be added to deliberations. In contrast to the shareholder
primacy theory, this developing doctrine is known as the corporate
stakeholder theory.
3
To bridge the gap between the traditional shareholder primacy norm and
the burgeoning calls for corporations to elevate stakeholder interests,
corporations have implemented so-called corporate social responsibility
(“CSR”) programs. In some cases, corporations that were faced with
boycotts or other public campaigns in response to incidents, such as
environmental disasters or labor abuses, adopted narrow CSR programs to
address specific complaints while in other cases CSR advocates, backed by
activist investors operating under the mantle of “socially responsible
investing” platforms, forced law-abiding corporations to adopt CSR
programs under the guise of good corporate citizenship.
4
Socially
responsible investing programs can be seen as the means through which
activist investors compel corporations to adopt and implement CSR.
5
There
is no single agency or organization responsible for the socially responsible
investment agenda, but a United Nations (“U.N.”) affiliated organization
known as the Principles for Responsible Investment (“PRI”) is a primary
driver of the socially responsible investing movement and has over 1,700
3. See infra pp. 310–13.
4. See Sheila Bonini et al., Valuing Social Responsibility Programs, MCKINSEY&
COMPANY (July 2009), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-
corporate-finance/our-insights/valuing-social-responsibility-programs (stating that
companies have responded to concerns ranging from environmental impacts to obesity
by implementing social responsibility programs, and these programs help mitigate risks
and allow companies to uphold their end of the social contract they have made with the
public).
5. See Ronald Paul Hill et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Socially
Responsible Investing: A Global Perspective, 70 J. BUS. ETHICS 165, 166–67 (2007)
(linking corporate social responsibility and firm financial performance, further stating
that investors evaluate firms according to their attention to their important stakeholders).
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signatories with over $70 trillion of assets under management as of 2017.
6
In many ways, the rise of CSR programs can be seen as a logical interim
development to help boards of directors balance the need to respond to
aggrieved constituencies, on the one hand, with the relative paucity of tools
meant to deal with such issues available under corporation statutes, on the
other hand. Those who promote CSR programs, however, have myriad
agendas, some as benign as ensuring that companies are responsible for
pollution emitted into local communities and others acting as a facade for
political campaigns that punish targeted groups or entities.
7
In the worst of
cases, activists have used CSR programs as cover to promulgate campaigns
of racial and national origin discrimination.
8
Beginning in 2010, in response to the rise of CSR programs, a number of
American states formally addressed the need for a new corporate form that
tempered shareholder primacy and elevated corporate stakeholder interests
by creating a new statutory corporate form that allows shareholders to adopt
non-financial objectives for the corporation (these entities are known as
“Benefit Corporations”).
9
A majority of American states now have some
form of Benefit Corporation statute.
10
6. See generally About the PRI, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., https://
www.unpri.org/about-the-pri (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (stating that the PRI is a leading
advocate for responsible investment and works to act in the long term interests of its
signatories and the financial markets in which they operate); Annual Report 2017,
PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. (2017) https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=3976
(providing an overview of the 2017 signatories’ activity and assets).
7. See generally Pamela N. Danziger,When Corporate Social Responsibility Veers
Into Political Action: Safe Or Sorry?, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2018, 6:50 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/pamdanziger/2018/03/12/when-corporate-social-responsibility-
veers-into-political-action-safe-or-sorry/#4fc67b6257d3 (discussing the recent change in
corporate responses to political issues which oftentimes now includes contentious social
and political activism).
8. See discussion infra Section V.B.i.
9. See Certification Requirements, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/
certification/meet-the-requirements (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (outlining the
requirements necessary to become a certified B corporation and reviewing that a
corporation that is not a statutory benefit corporation could attain benefit corporation
status by undergoing B-Lab certification, but the non-benefit corporation code of that
company’s jurisdiction of incorporation would still govern traditional corporate
governance matters);General Questions, BENEFITCORP., https://benefitcorp.net/faq (last
visited Feb. 9, 2020) (stating that a benefit corporation is a legal tool that allows
organizations to create solid foundations built upon mission alignment and value creation
and referencing statutory benefit corporations, rather than similarly labeled organizations
that are certified by the non-profit organization B-Lab).
10. See General Questions, BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/faq (last visited
Feb. 9, 2020) (highlighting active legislation regarding benefit corporations in over half
the country, and numerous states are working to implement their own as well).
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The question of how an American corporation can adopt and abide by a
CSR program containing guidelines that conflict with local and federal
American laws is one that has received minimal scholarly attention to this
point, a task this article tackles.
This Article provides an overview of the shareholder primacy norm and
competing theories of the corporation followed by a brief history of CSR
programs in Europe and the United States (“U.S.”). This Article then
examines whether CSR programs are viable under state corporation law
generally and, specifically, under Delaware corporation law, where many
publicly traded corporations are incorporated and where a strong Benefit
Corporation statute exists. Next, this Article examines how CSR programs
have been used to compel corporations into adopting discriminatory policies
and how those policies constitute violations of state and federal anti-
discrimination laws, putting companies that adopt such CSR programs at risk
of legal sanction. Finally, this Article examines the legal risks faced by a
corporation that adopts a CSR program that incorporates unlawful
discrimination.
II. THEORIES OF THECORPORATION
Though a full discussion of the history of corporations in the U.S. is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is generally acknowledged that private
business corporations began forming in the U.S. shortly after the effective
date of the Constitution in 1789 and by 1832 the underpinnings of modern
American corporation law had been established.
11
The first of what can be
described as modern state corporation statutes was enacted in New Jersey in
1888, followed by Delaware in 1899.
12
By the early twentieth century,
Delaware’s corporation code had become the dominant state code, as it
remains today.
13
At present, most corporations are formed pursuant to state
11. See generally Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of
Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU L. REV. 23 (2002) (noting that early American
corporations were formed through the establishment of private articles of agreement and
special acts of state legislatures, rather than pursuant to state or federal incorporation
statutes, and approximately 350 such corporations were created by 1801); id. at 44
(setting the publication of the first treatise on American corporations in 1832 as the
beginning of the era of modern American corporations); id. at 50 (citing JOSEPH K.
ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE (1832 ed., New York: Arno Press 1972)).
12. See Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate
Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 327,
340 (2007) (acknowledging that New Jersey’s 1888 statute expressly gave corporations
the right to purchase and hold stock in other corporations).
13. See id. at 325, 361 (observing that Delaware emerged as the dominant force in
the race to have the highest number of companies incorporated within its state borders);
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corporation statutes.
14
Because Delaware is the leading state for incorporations of publicly traded
corporations and the corporation code of Delaware, the Delaware General
Corporation Law (“DGCL”),
15
is considered the lodestar for American
corporate law principles,
16
this article will focus on the DGCL. Moreover,
as this article also focuses on corporate legal principles applicable to publicly
traded corporations, the DGCL will be deemed to be representative of all
state corporation laws, solely for purposes of the legal analysis contained
herein.
A corporation is organized by an incorporator who files a certificate of
incorporation with the Secretary of State (some states refer to this document
as articles of incorporation).
17
The certificate of incorporation can take any
number of forms to reflect the founders’ reasons for forming the corporation,
but it must include the name of the corporation, the name of the incorporator,
the address of the registered office of the corporation in the state, the purpose
of the corporation (which is frequently nothing more than “any purpose
allowed by the DGCL”),
18
and basic details about the capitalization of the
Jeffrey W. Bullock, Sec’y of State, Delaware Division of Corporations 2016 Annual
Report, CORPFILES (2016), https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/2016AnnualReport.pdf
(stating that as of 2016, over 65 percent of Fortune 500 companies were incorporated in
Delaware and 89 percent of U.S. companies undertaking an initial public offering of
securities were incorporated in Delaware). See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (tracing the history of Delaware’s rise to
prominence among state corporation statutes).
14. See, e.g., KEVINR. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22230, CONGRESSIONAL
OR FEDERAL CHARTERS: OVERVIEW AND ENDURING ISSUES (2013), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/RS22230.pdf (demonstrating the idea that corporations can be formed with
congressional or federal charters).
15. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–398 (2019).
16. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212–13 (Harv. U. Press, 1996) (“[Delaware’s] success
comes from its enabling statute, its large body of precedents and sophisticated corporate
bar, and its credible commitment to be receptive to corporate needs because of the large
percentage of its state revenues derived from franchise fees and taxes.”); see also Jack
B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s Retrospective,
5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 145 (2015) (discussing how Delaware has been able to
“transform and evolve corporate law into what it has become today”).
17. See How to Form a New Business Entity, DEL. DIVISION OF CORPS. [hereinafter
How to Form a New Business Entity], https://corp.delaware.gov/howtoform/ (last visited
Feb. 9, 2020) (giving an overview of the incorporation process in Delaware including the
“Delaware Incorporation Form”).
18. See, e.g., Certificate of Corporation for Stock Corporation, DEL. DIVISION OF
CORPS., https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/incstk09.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (providing
a sample certificate of incorporation provided as part of the Delaware Incorporation
Form); How to Form a New Business Entity, supra note 17 (providing additional links
and samples for incorporating in Delaware).
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corporation, such as how many classes of equity the corporation can issue,
preference of those shares, if any, and the number of shares thereof.
19
After the certification of incorporation has been filed with and accepted
by the Secretary of State, the existence of the corporation commences.
Thereafter, it is customary for the incorporator to appoint the initial members
of the board of directors, adopt bylaws that govern the conduct of the
corporation and then resign (thus allowing the newly appointed members of
the board of directors to select officers for the corporation), and begin
operating the business of the corporation.
20
Under the DGCL, a business can be formed as either a traditional for-profit
corporation where shareholder primacy is the guiding principle (“Traditional
Corporation”) or as a Benefit Corporation (referred to in the DGCL as a
“Public Benefit Corporation”).
21
If the corporation is a Public Benefit
Corporation, it must include two additional components to its certificate of
incorporation: a statement that it is a Public Benefit Corporation and the
specific social benefits that the corporation is to provide.
22
With a Traditional Corporation, unless the certificate of incorporation has
specified a corporate purpose, the corporation can conduct any lawful
business allowed by the state.
23
A Public Benefit Corporation, on the other
hand, is limited under the laws of the jurisdiction of its incorporation to
engaging in acts that are in furtherance of the social benefits it was formed
to provide. As a result, when compared to a Social Benefit Corporation, a
Traditional Corporation might be viewed as having an existential question:
if a Traditional Corporation can do anything lawful, what should guide its
board of directors in operating the business? The answer to this question can
be found in what is known as primacy theory.
19. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102.
20. STEVEN R. GERSZ, LEXISNEXIS ANSWERGUIDE NEW YORK BUSINESS ENTITIES
§ 5.07 (2018) (stating that incorporators often do not serve on the board but appoint the
board soon after filing the certificate of incorporation).
21. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (governing Public Benefit
Corporations).
22. See id. § 362(a) (defining a public benefit corporation).
23. See, e.g., Lurie v. Arizona Fertilizer & Chemical Co., 421 P.2d 330 (Ariz. 1996)
(finding that certain acts regarding a corporation incorporated to manage hotels and other
real property entering into an agreement relating to farming were ultra vires). See
generally Stephen J. Leacock, The Rise and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in United
States, United Kingdom, and Commonwealth Caribbean Corporate Common Law: A
Triumph of Experience Over Logic, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 67 (2006) (discussing
how a generalized corporate purpose statement is so frequently used and therefore there
is a dearth of modern caselaw on corporate actions that violate the stated purpose of the
corporation, a doctrine known as ultra vires).
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A. The Traditional Shareholder Primacy Norm and Duties of
Corporate Directors
A century’s worth of caselaw has demonstrated that maximizing the value
of the shareholders’ investment in the company is at the core of each
Traditional Corporation’s being.
24
In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
25
decided
in 1919, the court explained the importance of shareholder value
maximization:
[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself,
to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
26
Nine decades later, in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,
27
the
Delaware Chancery Court reiterated that this principle continues to govern
the conduct of the Traditional Corporation’s board of directors:
The corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there
are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment.
[Its founders] opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit Delaware
corporation and voluntarily accepted millions of dollars from eBay as part
of a transaction whereby eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-
profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary
duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include
acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean at least that.
Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights
Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not
to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for
the benefit of its stockholders—no matter whether those stockholders are
individuals of modest means or a corporate titan of online
24. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681 (Mich. 1919) (memorializing
the principle of maximizing the value of the shareholder’s investment by finding that the
board of directors of a Traditional Corporation that gave preference to benefiting non-
shareholder interests over paying dividends to shareholders had breached its duty to the
shareholder); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 46 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(continuing the trend of maximizing the value of the shareholder’s investment into the
early part of the twenty-first century by finding that the board of directors of a Traditional
Corporation that adopted a plan to deter third parties from making offers to acquire the
corporation had breached its duty to shareholders).
25. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
26. Id. at 684.
27. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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commerce . . . . Directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot
deploy a rights plan to defend a business strategy that openly eschews
stockholder wealth maximization—at least not consistently with the
directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.
28
The enduring impact and relevancy of Dodge in corporate law was noted
by Professor Johnathan Macey, who wrote:
[t]he case is not a doctrinal oddity.Dodge v. Ford still has legal effect, and
is an accurate statement of the form, if not the substance, of the current
law that describes the fundamental purpose of the corporation. By way of
illustration, the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) Principles of Corporate
Governance (“Principles”), considered a significant, if not controlling,
source of doctrinal authority, are consistent with Dodge v. Ford’s core
lesson that corporate officers and directors have a duty to manage the
corporation for the purpose of maximizing profits for the benefit of
shareholders. Specifically, section 2.01 of the Principles makes clear that
“a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”
Significantly, the Principles specify that the goal of the corporation is
shareholder wealth maximization . . . . Moreover, the ALI expressly
emphasizes shareholder wealth rather than corporate wealth, and
specifically excludes labor interests as something that should be
maximized . . . .
29
The principle that a Traditional Corporation exists primarily to maximize
the value of its shareholders’ investments is the essence of what is often
referred to as the “Shareholder Primacy Norm.”
30
As with so many other
corporate law theories, there are a number of variations of the Shareholder
Primacy Norm. The two theories that have garnered the most traction are
traditional and radical shareholder primacy theories.
31
Professor David
28. Id. at 34–35.
29. Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v.
Ford, 3 VA. L.&BUS. REV. 177, 178 (2008) [hereinafterCommentary onDodge v. Ford];
see Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 517 (3d Cir. 1947) (“A
corporation is run for the benefit of its stockholders and not for that of its managers.”);
see also id. (indicating that federal courts have also concluded that the purpose of a
corporation is to serve its shareholders rather than other parties).
30. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278
(1998) (defining the Shareholder Primacy Norm as shareholder-centric focus of
corporate law found specifically within the law relating to fiduciary duties to make
decisions that are in the best interests of the shareholders); see also Lyman Johnson &
David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1899–1907 (1989)
(detailing one of the first formal scholarly expositions on the use of the term shareholder
primacy and the substance of that term); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy,
10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1014 (2013) (exploring the contours of radical and
traditional shareholder primacy theories).
31. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night-
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Millon, a corporate law scholar who is well known for advancing the premise
that social welfare should become a corporate duty,
32
has examined both
radical and traditional shareholder primacy and, as part of his analysis, posits
that under radical shareholder primacy the board of directors can be
considered agents solely of the shareholders with a duty to their interests (the
maximization of the value of their investments in the corporation) alone.
33
Millon further explains that under radical shareholder primacy it is the duty
of the board of directors to maximize short term shareholder returns at the
risk of long term returns, if that is what the shareholders choose.
34
With
traditional shareholder primacy, on the other hand, the board of directors
may act to achieve objectives other than short term shareholder value
maximization, such as expanding market share or developing new products
that are expected to hurt short term profits but result in longer term enterprise
value increases, so long as the primary longer term objective remains
providing benefits to shareholders, rather than third parties.
35
Professor Millon acknowledges that radical shareholder primacy “enjoys
broad currency among corporate executives and major shareholders” and is
“widely — though not universally — embraced by legal academics”
36
but
concludes that there is no legal basis for radical shareholder primacy, while
there is for traditional shareholder primacy (and its focus on ensuring that
the board of directors focuses on providing benefits to shareholders, rather
than to third parties, even if those benefits are not short-term profit
Watchman State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39, 41–42 (2015) (citing Leo E. Strine
&NicholasWalter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative
Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2015)) (noting
that Justice Strine and Mr. Walter conflate radical and traditional shareholder primacy
theories when they discuss “conservative corporate law theory” and also arguing that
Strine and Walter overstate the extent to which Citizens United has resulted in
corporations externalizing costs to society in general); Millon, supra note 30, at 1014.
32. SeeWilliam W. Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 768 (2017) (highlighting Millon’s institutional vision to
use corporate law to protect people from the free market).
33. Millon, supra note 30, at 1018.
34. Id. at 1019 (noting that for many institutional investors, short term returns are of
primary importance, and if those shareholders have the requisite vote under the
corporation’s governing document, they can require the board to forego other matters
that the board might otherwise consider, such as employee welfare or long-run
sustainability).
35. Id. at 1022–23 (distinguishing traditional shareholder primary from radical
shareholder primacy by arguing that under the traditional theory, the board of directors
are not agents of the shareholders and, in fact, are free to act as they wish subject only to
the limitation that they “may not prioritize non-shareholder interests over those of
shareholders”).
36. Id. at 1043.
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maximization).
37
In claiming that there is no legal basis for radical
shareholder primacy, Professor Millon discusses both Dodge v. Ford and
eBay v. Newmark.
38
Interestingly, when looking at the arc of caselaw traced
by these two cases, Professor Millon demonstrates that courts have
consistently ruled that in most situations (hostile takeovers being an
exception),
39
the board’s duty is to maximize shareholder value, but he then
argues that radical shareholder primacy theory is nowhere to be found in the
text of statutory corporate law.
40
While Millon’s statement is literally
accurate — corporate statutory law does not explicitly state that short-term
profit maximization is the objective that the board must work towards —
statutory duties of the board (discussed infra), have been consistently
interpreted and applied by courts in a manner that is not only consistent with
traditional shareholder primacy, but is often also consistent with radical
37. Id. at 1044.
38. See id. at 1034–35 (emphasizing that shareholder power is not grounded in
corporate law, but rather in Delaware corporate law highlights that fiduciary duties are
owed to “the corporation and its shareholders”).
39. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for
Corporate Control and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978).
A hostile takeover bid is an unsolicited offer by a third party to acquire control of a
corporation from then-existing shareholders that is opposed by the board of directors of
the target corporation. The potential acquiror appeals directly to the shareholders,
generally offering a premium to the then-current price of the shares being sought. Often,
the incumbent board of directors of the target corporation will oppose the bid on grounds
that it undervalues the future value of the corporation or otherwise is likely to materially
and adversely impact shareholders and third-party stakeholders, such as the communities
that the corporation operates in. Delaware courts routinely allow the target corporation’s
board of directors to recommend against the bid and take defensive measures to thwart
the acquisition. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152
(Del. 1990) (allowing directors to use defensive measures in response to a merger
proposal where an existing corporate transaction that might lead to enhanced long term
shareholder value maximization was already under consideration); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (allowing directors to consider the effect
of a tender offer on non-shareholder parties); id. (“If a defensive measure is to come
within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the
threat posed. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid
and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include:
inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the
impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees,
and perhaps even the community generally) . . . .”). ContraRevlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184–85 (Del. 1986) (holding that defensive
measures taken to prevent a hostile takeover that are not considered as measures that also
maximize shareholder profit breach the duty of care and are not entitled to deference
under the business judgment rule); see discussion infra note 53.
40. SeeMillon, supra note 30, at 1014, 1023 (noting that radical shareholder primacy
differs from traditional shareholder primacy, which still claims to privilege shareholders,
but is weaker than under the radical version that has no ground in statutory law or
common law).
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shareholder primacy.
41
Even in the unusual doctrinal situation of corporate takeover law, where
the board of directors is allowed to deviate from radical shareholder primacy,
traditional shareholder primacy is still the rule and, as will be discussed in
more detail in this Article, there are no cases that say a Traditional
Corporation can sacrifice shareholder wealth maximization to further the
aims of third parties.
42
According to Professor Millon, the clear language of eBay regarding the
board’s duty to elevate shareholder interests over external matters should be
seen as an anomaly because the opinion does not cite to precedent
43
and it is
a case where a board blatantly eschewed profit to pursue a social mission,
rather than a more difficult case of a board choosing one form of shareholder
benefit over another, such as long term versus short term wealth
maximization.
44
This, again, is an accurate analysis of the case, and while
Millon may not have intended to do so, and because he shows no case where
traditional shareholder primacy and its requirement that the board only work
to promote shareholder interests is denigrated in Delaware in favor of non-
shareholder interest advocacy, he has bolstered the case for shareholder
primacy over corporate stakeholder theory.
45
Other scholars have explicitly noted that “in no case has the all-important
Delaware Supreme Court held that directors will be permitted to prefer the
interests of other constituencies over shareholders or that they ought, as a
normative matter, to take such interests into account.”
46
To put an
41. See Jonathan Macey, Sublime Myths: An Essay in Honor of the Shareholder
Value Myth and the Tooth Fairy, 91 TEXASL. REV. 911, 917 (2013) [hereinafter Sublime
Myths] (reviewing LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012))
(noting that the shareholder primacy norm is an ideology, rather than black letter law but
“it is an ideology with a basis in reason and in fact.”); id. at 918–19 (exposing the flaws
in Professor Stout’s groundless derogation of the shareholder primacy norm); id. (“A lot
of important legal doctrines, like the corporate opportunity doctrine, the duty of loyalty,
and the duty of care are anchored in the shareholder value-maximization model/myth. It
would be bad simply to jettison these doctrines because, notwithstanding that they may
be grounded in the myth of shareholder primacy, these doctrines reduce managerial
pilfering and negligence and make corporations more valuable than they would be if they
did not exist.”).
42. See Corporate Social Responsibility, infra note 46 and accompanying text.
43. Millon, supra note 30, at 1036.
44. Id. (reading the facts of the case narrowly to endorse the shareholder primacy
idea in a highly unusual manner).
45. Bratton, supra note 32, at 786 (spotting that Professor Millon’s colleague
concluded “shareholder maximization is confirmed as the firm’s theoretical objective
function.”).
46. Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Law & Economics
Perspective, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 331, 344 (2014) [hereinafter Corporate Social
2020 DISCRIMINATION AS A BUSINESS POLICY 319
exclamation point on the certainty of the shareholder primacy norm, the
legendary corporate law scholar and current Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court, Leo E. Strine, explicitly stated that “American corporate law
makes corporate managers accountable to only one constituency
— stockholders — and that accountability has been tightened because of
market developments concentrating voting power in institutional investors
and information technology innovations easing communication and joint
action among stockholders.”
47
Chief Justice Strine predicted that
progressive scholars and activists would try to divine exceptions to the
shareholder primacy norm in favor of a form of stakeholder theory from
Strine’s own words,
48
and in a 2017 law review article he rebutted these
attempts by referring to the projection of stakeholder theory into Delaware
law as “wish-fulfillment” and equating these positions to a “dream world”
exercise in arguing what the law ought to be rather than what it actually is.
49
This is not to say that the board of directors of a Traditional Corporation
are utterly handcuffed to the will of shareholders. As long as the board acts
in a manner that fulfills its duties to shareholders, it can have wide latitude
in making corporate decisions as it sees fit.
50
To wit, a board of directors of
a Traditional Corporation is under an obligation to fulfill two general duties
to the corporation and its shareholders: the duty of loyalty and the duty of
Responsibility].
47. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 241–42 (2014) [hereinafter Do the Right Thing].
48. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 766–67 (2015) [hereinafter
The Dangers of Denial] (taking to task those who claim that Delaware statutory and
caselaw do not really enshrine the shareholder primacy norm into law by noting that
“these commentators argue that the business judgment rule is cloaking a system of law
giving directors the ability to act for any reason they deem appropriate. These
commentators argue that cases with contrary holdings have simply been misinterpreted
and misunderstood. For example, these scholars argue that one of the most important
cases in Delaware law history, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., is
really a marginally important decision, and that it has been misinterpreted. Indeed, these
commentators essentially argue that Delaware judges do not understand the very law
they are applying, and the Delaware General Assembly does not understand the law it
has created. It is not only hollow but also injurious to social welfare to declare that
directors can and should do the right thing by promoting interests other than stockholder
interests.”).
49. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement
for Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. &LEEL. REV.
1165, 1174 (2017) [hereinafter Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II].
50. William M. Lafferty et al., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of
Directors Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 837, 841–42 (2012) (explaining
the general fiduciary duties that the board of directors owe to the shareholders of a
company).
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care.
51
Under the duty of loyalty, the board of directors must put the interests of
the corporation and its shareholders above any interests of the board, as a
whole, or individual directors.
52
Under the duty of care, the board is required
to ensure that it makes decisions through a deliberative process where
appropriate information is obtained and considered
53
and, as needed, experts
are consulted,
54
though there is no expectation that the board of directors will
be informed of every fact or make a perfect decision.
Indeed, an entire doctrine known as the “Business Judgment Rule” exists
to protect the board of directors of a Traditional Corporation from judicial
second-guessing.
55
The Delaware Court of Chancery artfully explained the
balancing act between duties of the board and inevitable negative outcomes
represented by the Business Judgement Rule in a 2005 opinion:
51. See id. at 841, 847–48 (stating that there are also ancillary duties that derive from
the duties of loyalty and care: the duties of good faith, confidentiality and disclosure);
see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 141(a) (2019) (stating that duties are not statutory;
rather, they have been judicially derived from the statutory requirement that the board of
directors manage the business and affairs of the corporation); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (“Thus, a director’s duty to exercise an informed business
judgment is in the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty.”);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The members of the board
of directors or a board committee, when becoming informed in connection with their
decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall
discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably
believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”).
52. See Lafferty et al., supra note 50, at 845 (“In general, the duty of loyalty means
that directors of Delaware corporations may not (i) cause the corporation to engage in an
interested transaction which is not entirely fair to the corporation; (ii) profit from the use
of confidential corporate information; (iii) take any action solely or primarily to entrench
themselves in office; or (iv) otherwise place benefits to themselves or to affiliated entities
ahead of benefits of the corporation.”).
53. See id. at 842–43 (“Determining directors’ compliance with the duty of care is a
fact-specific inquiry. Factors considered by Delaware courts addressing this issue
include whether directors (i) are supplied in advance with notice of the purpose of the
meeting and documentation describing the essentials of the matters to be considered, (ii)
are informed of all developments relevant to the issue under consideration, (iii) conduct
extensive discussions with competent and independent legal and financial advisors, (iv)
review relevant or key documents or summaries thereof, (v) make reasonable inquiry and
receive a knowledgeable critique of the proposal, and (vi) take sufficient time under the
circumstances and act in a deliberative manner to consider and evaluate the pending
decision.”).
54. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 146.
55. See generally Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the
Business Judgment Rule: Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 1 (2010–2011) (describing the history of the business judgment rule and
explaining how the business judgment rule does not hold the board of the directors
accountable for not maximizing shareholder profits).
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The decision-makers entrusted by shareholders must act out of loyalty
to those shareholders. They must in good faith act to make informed
decisions on behalf of the shareholders, untainted by self-interest. Where
they fail to do so, this Court stands ready to remedy breaches of fiduciary
duty.
Even where decision-makers act as faithful servants, however, their
ability and the wisdom of their judgments will vary. The redress for
failures that arise from faithful management must come from the markets,
through the action of shareholders and the free flow of capital, and not
from this Court. Should the Court apportion liability based on the ultimate
outcome of decisions taken in good faith by faithful directors or officers,
those decision-makers would necessarily take decisions that minimize
risk, not maximize value. The entire advantage of the risk-taking,
innovative, wealth-creating engine that is the Delaware corporation would
cease to exist, with disastrous results for shareholders and society alike.
That is why, under our corporate law, corporate decision-makers are held
strictly to their fiduciary duties, but within the boundaries of those duties
are free to act as their judgment and abilities dictate, free of post hoc
penalties from a reviewing court using perfect hindsight. Corporate
decisions are made, risks are taken, the results become apparent, capital
flows accordingly, and shareholder value is increased.
56
In other words, courts will not substitute their judgement for that which
was made by the board of directors so long as the board adhered to their
fiduciary duties in making the ultimately unsatisfactory corporate decision.
57
Here, again, we see the court explicitly endorsing the shareholder primacy
norm, and charging shareholders, rather than the courts, with the obligation
to reward or punish directors for the consequences of their actions. While
maximizing shareholder value may not be a statutory duty of the board, it is
clearly the governing principle of corporate behavior.
58
Some scholars,
acknowledging that the shareholder primacy norm is the guiding principle in
American corporate law, note that shareholders can be left without sufficient
power to protect their financial interests in a Traditional Corporation due to
the breadth of the business judgment rule and the undemocratic nature of the
board nomination process (where the board itself selects nominees), both of
56. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
57. See id.
58. See, e.g., Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 55, at 3–4 (noting that the interplay of the
shareholder primacy norm and the Business Judgment Rule results in the board of
directors having an incentive to prioritize short term gains over long term viability of the
corporation, for example share repurchases and permissible accounting “tricks” such as
accelerating income recognition while deferring expenses, lead to short term share price
spikes but have little or no long-term benefits).
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which conspire to entrench incumbent directors.
59
While this concern may
have validity, it is a critique of established law and a call for future reforms
that give sharper teeth to shareholder rights, rather than an argument that the
shareholder primacy norm and its directive that a corporation exists to
maximize shareholder value are not currently the guiding principle in
corporate law. Until such reforms are enacted, the shareholder primacy norm
prevails.
60
It is at this juncture that the interplay of certain state corporation statutes
and the shareholder primacy norm may appear to be in conflict. Among the
significant deviations from the DGCL in other states’ corporation codes is
the “constituency statute” concept, which allows a board of directors to
consider how decisions will impact third parties, such as employees, local
and national economies, and other societal considerations.
61
Importantly,
59. See id. at 38 (“The shareholder primacy norm remains the ‘bedrock principle of
U.S. corporate law.’ And under the business judgment rule, unless shareholders can rebut
the presumption directors were not acting in the best interests of the corporation, those
shareholders have no legal recourse against those directors no matter how stupid,
egregious, or irrational board decisions may be. Shareholders not only lack recourse in
the courts, they lack recourse in the selection and retention of directors.”); see alsoGrant
M. Hayden &Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward
Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2076–77 (2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk,
The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 722–23 (2007).
60. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC 24–25
(Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2012) (attempting to argue that the shareholder primacy
norm does not guide American corporate law theory by conflating prospective policy
arguments for replacing shareholder primacy with stakeholder theory with claims that
stakeholder theory is, in fact, already the guiding principle); Millon, supra note 30, at
1036 (discussing the eBay case and noting that the court ruled in favor of eBay’s claim
of breach of duty because the board of directors of Craigslist had chosen to “eschew
profit in order to pursue a social mission”). But see Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interests, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (basing his argument
that shareholder wealth maximization is not the guiding principle for the board of
directors by noting that boards “have always had some legal discretion (implicit or
explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the public interests”). This is typical of
progressive scholars’ arguments against shareholder primacy and it is a hollow argument.
An exception on the fringe of a rule, such as the ability of a board of directors to engage
in minor acts of social philanthropy with corporate assets, does not vitiate the rule. Just
as a board that donates a small amount of corporate profits to, say, a local school, can do
so without fear of claims it has breached its duties, a board that managed the corporation
in a way that favored giving to local schools over producing returns for shareholders
would most certainly run afoul of the applicable corporate law statute of its jurisdiction
of incorporation.
61. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (2019). See generally Mark J.
Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 453
(1997) (describing the various forms of state constituency statutes); Joseph R. Shealy,
The Corporate Identity Theory Dilemma: North Carolina and the Need for
Constructionist Corporate Law Reform, 94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016).
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while constituency statutes give directors of a Traditional Corporation
discretion to consider non-shareholder interests, they do not vest third parties
with legally enforceable rights and do not obligate directors to consider third
party interests.
62
Connecticut, prior to amendments to its corporation code
in 2010, was one state that required directors of publicly traded corporations
to consider third party interests in making decisions relating to business
combinations, but that requirement was considered antithetical to traditional
theories of the corporation and was eliminated.
63
Furthermore, while constituency statutes exist, they have rarely been used
to support board actions that favor stakeholder theory over shareholder
primacy, and it is likely the case that constituency statutes would not survive
challenges if a board were to ever use one as a basis for denigrating the
financial interests of shareholders in favor of third parties.
64
Finally, the fact that states have had to enact constituency statutes, and
corporations have had to adopt provisions in governing documents (all of
which require shareholder approval), to allow for deviations from the
shareholder primacy norm reinforces the notion that absent explicit statutory
and shareholder action to permit the consideration of third-party
stakeholders, American corporate law, and Delaware’s in particular, does not
allow the board of directors to favor non-shareholder constituencies over
shareholders.
B. Stakeholder Theory
Under U.S. corporate law, stakeholder theory is not a legal doctrine other
than in several isolated situations, such as Benefit Corporation statutes, states
with constituency provisions of their corporate codes (which generally do
not apply to publicly traded companies since most such companies are
62. Shealy, supra note 61 (arguing policy arguments for and against the
implementation of constituency statutes).
63. David A. Swerdloff, Connecticut Updates Business Corporation Act; Clarifies
Director Obligations, Shareholders Rights, DAY PITNEY LLP (May 17, 2010),
https://www.daypitney.com/insights/publications/2010/05/connecticut-updates-
business-corporation-act-cla__.
64. See Nathan E. Standley, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the
Constituency Statute, 4 ELON L. REV. 209, 223 (2012) (citing Anthony Bisconti, The
Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible
Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 784 (2009)) (“In the
states that have enacted constituency statutes, very few judicial opinions have evaluated
and interpreted these statutes. The opinions concerning constituency statutes appear to
conform them to the Delaware common law. These courts have hesitated to deviate from
the longstanding principle of shareholder primacy, even though state legislatures have
enacted statutes that purport to change the longstanding principle. Instead, ‘constituency
statutes currently function only to the extent that they do not conflict with shareholder
primacy.’”).
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incorporated in Delaware), or in Delaware under the specific circumstance
when the board of directors of a Traditional Corporation is defending against
a hostile takeover.
65
As a general rule, though, stakeholder theory under U.S.
corporate law is nothing more than an aspirational progressive policy goal;
something without enforceable legal effect under corporate law.
66
One example of the few exceptions to the shareholder primacy norm for
Traditional Corporations is the allowance for the board to consider third
party interests in defense of a hostile takeover attempt (that is, a scenario
where a potential acquirer makes an offer to acquire control of a company in
spite of the fact that the board of directors is opposed to the potential
transaction).
67
While Delaware courts initially indicated that the impact of a
transaction on non-shareholder constituencies could be considered by the
board of directors when faced with a hostile takeover (known as the “Unocal
Exception”), subsequent decisions rendered that exception much narrower
than originally thought.
68
At this point, while there is still some applicability
of the general contours of the Unocal Exception for stakeholder theory in
Delaware corporate law, it is not at all clear that the doctrine has any practical
impact on the incorporation of stakeholder theory into Delaware corporate
law.
69
65. See Fischel, supra note 39, at 30–40; discussion supra note 39 (hostile takeover
defenses).
66. See Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It
Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBALL.&BUS. 249, 249 (2010) (“Notwithstanding the fact that the
United States, United Kingdom, and other Anglo-American jurisdictions regularly
embrace shareholder primacy, there are many who feel that some of these jurisdictions
are moving towards more of a stakeholder approach to corporate governance.”); id.
(hypothesizing that stakeholder theory may become the corporate law standard in the
U.S. in the future, but shareholder primacy occupies that position until such time).
67. See Fischel, supra note 39 (describing the remedial defense tactics in order to
prevent hostile takeover of a corporation).
68. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes,
19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 980–84 (1992) (analyzing case law pertaining to structural
decisions made by a board of directors in a corporate control contest).
69. See id. at 981 (posing, after examining the post-Unocal decision of Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), the hypothetical
of a corporate raider making an otherwise fairly valued offer for a company but indicating
that she planned to lay off the a large part of the workforce upon consummation of the
acquisition, and asking whether under Unocal the court would allow the board of
directors could determine that the harm to the workforce outweighed the benefits to
shareholders.); id. (concluding that the board in his hypothetical could not favor the
workforce over shareholders and stating that Revlon modified Unocal in the following
ways: “First . . . any management action benefiting stakeholders must produce ancillary
shareholder benefits. In other words, directors may only consider stakeholder interests if
doing so would benefit shareholders. Second, where a corporate control auction
triggering the so-called Revlon duties has begun, stakeholders become entirely
irrelevant. Instead, shareholder wealth maximization is the board’s only appropriate
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Stakeholder theory recognizes shareholders as just one of the many parties
that have an interest in a corporation and, as such, must be heard by the
directors when corporate decisions are to be made.
70
Under stakeholder
theory, constituencies such as employees, the local community, creditors,
and even governments
71
constitute the body to which the board of directors
is responsible.
72
The board of directors must balance the interests of all
stakeholders when making decisions, taking a role that has been described
as the mediator for stakeholder interests.
73
As for what comprises the
universe of stakeholders, Professor Andrew Keay has reviewed the work of
other scholars on this question and concludes that the primary universe of
corporate stakeholders is made up of “employees, shareholders, suppliers,
financial institutions and lenders, general creditors, customers, the local
community, local and national governments, and the environment.”
74
As for what the directors of a stakeholder-oriented corporation should
attend to when making decisions, Professor Keay cites to the work of Janice
Dean, who proposed the following:
A director of a public limited company shall in all his/her conduct and
decision making so act as to advance the development of the company in
the interests of its customers, its employees and its shareholders and with
proper regard for the effect of its operations on the environment and on
the community. The interests to which a director of a public company
should give due consideration include:
• The provision for customers of safe and effective goods and
services of good quality at fair prices;
• The provision for employees of fair remuneration and
secure work with reasonable opportunity for their interests
to be heard within the company and for their promotion and
development of skills;
• The provision for shareholders of fair returns to remunerate
concern. As such, when the business judgment rule does not apply to insulate the
directors’ decisions from judicial review, the board will violate its fiduciary duty of
shareholder wealth maximization if it considers any interests other than those of the
shareholders. In turn, this confirms that the duty to maximize shareholder wealth is the
principal obligation of directors, albeit one as to which judicial scrutiny is sometimes
barred by the business judgment rule.”); id. (concluding that, even where Delaware
courts provided an opening for stakeholder theory, they quickly narrowed it in favor of
shareholder primacy).
70. See Keay, supra note 66, at 255–56 (explaining stakeholder theory and listing
the diverse parties that have an interest in a corporation, stockholders being one of these
parties).
71. See id. at 257–58.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 257.
74. Id. at 260.
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past investment and encourage future investment in the
company;
• The provision for key business associates including
suppliers of goods and services of secure relationships and
ongoing co-operation where such connections offer
advantages to both parties;
• The provision for the community of programmes to monitor
and minimise the environmental impact of the company’s
operations and advance responsible conduct towards the
company’s neighbours.
75
These prescriptions are at once specific in language yet vague in
prescription, to the point of being incapable of implementation.
76
The only
way for a board to successfully carry out Dean’s menu is to either be
micromanaged by some superior power (which does not exist in corporate
law) or to have the latitude to alter, ignore, and add to the directives at their
core, which would result in the board having the same duties as they would
have under the shareholder primacy norm. Professor Keay reaches a similar
conclusion, stating that
[t]he point has been made that stakeholder theory has failed to provide any
normative foundations for its justification. In particular, it fails to provide
a normative base on which to ascertain who can be a stakeholder and what
weight ought to be given to each stakeholder. Consequently, there is no
basis for a manager, in running the corporation, to prefer stakeholderism
to other moral approaches.
77
Though stakeholder theory is primarily a policy goal for progressive
scholars and activists in the U.S., it is a core principle of corporate law in a
number of foreign jurisdictions.
78
In Germany, employees (without having
75. Id. at 261–62 (citing JANICE DEAN, DIRECTING PUBLIC COMPANIES: COMPANY
LAW AND THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 138 (2001)).
76. See id. (explaining that a fair return for shareholders, without further
quantification, is a directive without context. Would a fair return be a set number of basis
points above long-term U.S. Treasury yields? If so, how would the returns be adjusted
for early stage, unprofitable high growth corporations as compared to an established,
profitable, low-growth corporation?).
77. Id. at 270.
78. See Fabian Brandt & Konstantinos Georgiou, Shareholders vs Stakeholders
Capitalism, COMP. CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (2016), http://scholarship.
law.upenn.edu/fisch_2016/10 (discussing, as case studies, methods used by the U.S. and
Germany to mediate the tensions between shareholder interests and stakeholder
interests); see also PAULKRÜGERANDERSEN&EVELYNE J.B. SØRENSEN, THE PRINCIPLE
OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IN COMPANY LAW FROM A NORDIC AND EUROPEAN
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE, THE EUROPEAN FINANCIALMARKET IN TRANSITION (Hanne
Birkmose et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, 2011) (analyzing trends in the U.S. and
Europe that have promoted increased shareholder influence in corporate decision-
making).
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to be shareholders of the company) are given a say in matters of corporate
governance and are also represented on the boards of directors.
79
Similarly,
employees in Japanese companies have broad board representation and
stakeholder rights, though this is through immutable custom rather than
statute.
80
A full review of the role of stakeholder theory in jurisdictions
outside of the U.S. is beyond the scope of this Article, but as a general
principle it can be said that stakeholder theory has more of a legal foundation
outside the U.S., while shareholder primacy norms prevail to the exclusion
of stakeholder theory in the U.S.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF THECORPORATE SOCIALRESPONSIBILITY
DOCTRINE
As a general concept, CSR can be defined as a set of principles whereby
corporations consider the environmental and social impacts inherent in their
business activities.
81
The European Union, a leader in CSR implementation,
has defined CSR as
‘the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society.’ Respect for
applicable legislation, and for collective agreements between social
partners, is a prerequisite for meeting that responsibility. To fully meet
their corporate social responsibility, enterprises should have in place a
process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and
consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy in
close collaboration with their stakeholders, with the aim of:
• maximising the creation of shared value for their
owners/shareholders and for their other stakeholders and
society at large; [and]
• identifying, preventing andmitigating their possible adverse
impacts.
82
As one would expect for any guideline issued by a bureaucratic committee,
the European Union’s definition of CSR is exceedingly vague and is phrased
more in the manner of an aspirational concept rather than a substantive policy
that can be implemented with some level of certainty.
79. Mark J. Loewenstein,What Can We Learn From Foreign Systems? Stakeholder
Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1673, 1675–77 (2002).
80. Id. at 1686 (noting that as a matter of custom, directors of Japanese corporations
tend to be employees or former employees of that corporation).
81. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 6 COM
(2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
CELEX:52011DC0681 (elaborating on the European Commission’s definition of CSR).
82. Id.
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A. European Union CSR Guidelines
While not helping to clarify what CSR is, the European Union has stated
that its CSR strategy is based on five guidelines and principles consisting of
the U.N. Global Compact (“UNGC”), the U.N. Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (“UNGP”), ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on
Social Responsibility (“ISO 26000”), the International Labour Organization
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises on
Social Policy (“ILO Declaration”), and the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (“OECD Guidelines”).
83
Because European
Union CSR policy strongly influences both CSR advisors and U.S.
companies and regulators, a brief overview of the guidelines and principles
is presented below.
i. UNGC
The UNGC is a voluntary corporate citizenship initiative of the U.N.,
intended to promote globalization through leadership, policy dialogue,
learning, partnership projects, and outreach activities.
84
The primary parties
to the UNGC are governments, companies, labor, civil society organizations,
and the U.N.
85
While the operational mechanisms and intended goals of the
UNGC are fairly opaque, they have been generally described as
“establish[ing] the business case for doing the right thing. By setting
examples within its own sphere of influence, it hopes to generate positive
impulses that in turn can contribute towards governance and public responses
that contribute to a more beneficial relationship between business and
society.”
86
To accomplish these ends, the UNGC has ten principles: two
principles relating to human rights, four principles on labor, three principles
on the environment, and one principle on corruption.
87
83. Corporate Social Responsibility, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/
industry/corporate-social-responsibility_en (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
84. Georg Kell, The Global Compact: Origins, Operations, Progress, Challenges,
11 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 35, 35 (2003) (recognizing Mr. Kell as one of the primary
architects of the UNGC).
85. Id. at 37.
86. Id. at 41.
87. See The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOB.
COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last visited
Feb. 9, 2020) (stating that the two human rights principles are businesses should “support
and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights” and “make sure
that they are not complicit in human rights abuses;” the four labor principles are
businesses should uphold “the freedom of association and the effective recognition of
the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory
labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of discrimination in
respect of employment and occupation;” the three environmental principles are
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ii. UNGP
The UNGP are a set of thirty-one principles spread over three categories:
the state duty to respect human rights, the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights, and victim access to remedies.
88
Among the thirty-one
principles are requirements that “[s]tates must protect against human rights
abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including
business enterprises . . . taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate,
punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation,
regulations and adjudication”; “[b]usiness enterprises should respect human
rights . . . they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and
should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”;
and “[a]s part of their duty to protect against business-related human rights
abuse, States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial,
administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses
occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to
effective remedy.”
89
While the UNGP was unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights
Council and nominally applied to all businesses, without regard to size,
location, or structure, they explicitly state that “[n]othing in these Guiding
Principles should be read as creating new international law
obligations . . . .”
90
Of particular interest for purposes of this article is the
admonition in the opening to the UNGP: “[t]hese Guiding Principles should
be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner . . . .”
91
The UNGP have been criticized by left-leaning groups for not giving
governments compliance and enforcement powers over corporations and
instead relying upon businesses to police their own conduct, while others
have defended the UNGP as a workable compromise that creates a regulatory
framework where public and private governance work together.
92
businesses should “support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;
undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and encourage the
development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies;” and the anti-
corruption principle is businesses should “work against corruption in all its forms,
including extortion and bribery”).
88. See generally United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r,
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, HR/PUB/11/4 (2011), https://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
(providing the language of the thirty-one Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, accompanied by commentary).
89. Id. at 3, 13, 27.
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Chris Albin-Lackey,Without Rules: A Failed Approach to Corporate
Accountability, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, at 1 (2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/
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iii. ISO 26000
ISO 26000 is a benchmark for CSR developed by the nongovernmental
organization International Organization for Standardization (“IOS”). IOS
has a long history of using member input to achieve a consensus on the
establishment of relevant standards in technology, food safety, healthcare,
and manufacturing, as well as other areas.
93
IOS standards are not only used
by members, but also are often incorporated into laws and treaties.
94
The
U.N. granted ISO general consultative status with the U.N. Economic and
Social Council, which allows ISO to participate in U.N. activities, including
the right to speak before the U.N. and its constituent bodies.
95
IOS describes ISO 26000 as being intended to assist organizations in
contributing to sustainable development. It is intended to encourage them
to go beyond legal compliance, recognizing that compliance with law is a
fundamental duty of any organization and an essential part of their social
responsibility. It is intended to promote common understanding in the
field of social responsibility, and to complement other instruments and
initiatives for social responsibility, not to replace them.
96
ISO 26000 provides guidance on organizational governance, human rights,
default/files/related_material/business.pdf (“Much of the problem lies with companies
themselves-even though that think of themselves as ethical. Too many still deal with
human rights problems on the fly, without forethought and often in a de factor regulatory
vacuum that they lobby vigorously to maintain . . . the lion’s share of the responsibility
to prevent and address company-driven human rights abuses lies with governments.”).
But see, John Ruggie, Progress in Corporate Accountability, INSTIT. FORHUMANRIGHTS
AND BUS. (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.ihrb.org/focus-areas/benchmarking/commentary-
progress-corporate-accountability (rebutting Albin-Lackey’s criticism, noting that
adopting Albin-Lackey’s position of international government having unilateral control
over business activity would violate national sovereignty and inhibit competition, among
other things). John Ruggie developed the UNGP when he was the U.N. Secretary-
General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights.
93. All About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/about-
us.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (“ISO has published 22542 International Standards
and related documents, covering almost every industry, from technology, to food safety,
to agriculture and healthcare. ISO International Standards impact everyone,
everywhere.”).
94. JAMES ROBERTS, HOW CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (ISO 26000)
MANDATES UNDERMINE FREE MARKETS 1, 5 (May 3, 2010), https://www.heritage.org/
markets-and-finance/report/how-corporate-social-responsibility-iso-26000-mandates-
undermine-free.
95. Civil Society Participation: International Organization for Standardization,
UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/
consultativeStatusSummary.do?profileCode=468 (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (indicating
that ISO has had general consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council
since 1947).
96. ISO 26000: 2010, Guidance on Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/standard/42546.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
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labor practices, the environment, fair operating practices, consumer issues,
and community involvement, and development.
97
Some commentators have warned that while ISO 26000 is a voluntary
standard and, unlike other IOS standards, there is no certification possible
under ISO 26000, it is nonetheless a push by globalist groups such as
Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfam, ActionAid, and Social Watch
to force mandatory adoption of the UNGC by implementing CSR through
voluntary adoption of IOS standards.
98
Indeed, in 2004, then-U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan stated
[l]et me also commend ISO for broadening the scope of its work in the
area of social and environmental performance. In this way, too, you are
making an important contribution towards a more sustainable world. I
welcome, in particular, ISO’s recent decision to develop a standard on
social responsibility — an initiative which dovetails well with the
universal principles of the U.N. Global Compact on human rights, labour
conditions, the environment and anti-corruption.
99
iv. ILO Declaration
According to the International Labour Organization, a U.N. agency
consisting of employers, employees and governments, the ILO provides
“guidelines to [multinational enterprises], governments, and employers’ and
workers’ organizations in such areas as employment, training, conditions of
work and life, and industrial relations. Its provisions are reinforced by certain
international labour Conventions and Recommendations . . . .”
100
Specific
policy guidelines are provided on improving employment opportunities,
expanding social security, eliminating forced labor, abolishing child labor,
97. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, DISCOVERING ISO 260000 1, 12–13,
https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/store/en/PUB100258.pdf (last visited
Feb. 9, 2020) (outlining the core subjects and issues addressed by ISO).
98. ROBERTS, supra note 94, at 5–7 (acknowledging that in many cases CSR can be
“discrete, transparent and voluntary, [and] have the potential to make a positive
contribution to employees, employers, consumers and investors,” Roberts cautions that
ISO 26000 is a politically charged mutation of CSR that “seems to recite anew a laundry
list of grievances and daunting societal problems facing impoverished, developing
countries before establishing vague, all-encompassing, and impossible-to-meet
responsibilities to be imposed on each multinational firm, [which is] expected to foot the
substantial bills for rectifying the seeming endless list of problems outlined in each ISO
26000 chapter.”).
99. Katie Bird, ISO Standards ‘Crucial’ to Sustainable Development, Says UN
Secretary-General, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION (Sept. 15, 2004) (emphasis
added), https://www.iso.org/news/2004/09/Ref930.html.
100. ILO Declarations, INT’L LABOR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/how-the-ilo-works/departments-and-offices/jur/legal-
instruments/WCMS_428589/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
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promoting equal opportunity and treatment, ensuring employment stability
and security, and expanding rights to worker organization and collective
bargaining. As with other principles and guidelines, the ILO Declaration is
not a binding obligation on its own.
101
v. OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines are a code of conduct for multinational enterprises,
establishing non-binding standards of business ethics.
102
Developed by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, a forum of thirty-
six countries that strategizes on economic, social and environmental
measures and an observer at the U.N., the OECD Guidelines
. . . provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible business
conduct in a global context consistent with applicable laws and
internationally recognised standards . . . [and] . . . express the shared
values of the governments of countries from which a large share of
international direct investment originates and which are home to many of
the largest multinational enterprises. The Guidelines aim to promote
positive contributions by enterprises to economic, environmental and
social progress worldwide.
103
The OECD Guidelines contain general principles on sustainable
development, human rights, and compliance with applicable laws and
regulations, and more specific guidance on providing useful disclosure on all
aspects of the enterprise’s activities, respecting and promoting human rights,
treating workers fairly (including taking into account the effect of corporate
decisions on workers and the community), being good environmental
stewards, combatting corruption and other unethical activities, acting in the
best interests of consumers, developing technology with a focus on
promoting local interests, promptly and fully paying taxes as due, and
promoting competition in the market.
104
B. United States CSR Guidelines
In support of fostering CSR adoption by American corporations, the U.S.
government, after consulting with the private sector and other stakeholders,
101. See generally Jernej Letnar Cernic, Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights:
Analyzing the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy, 6 MISKOLC J. INT’L L. 24 (2009) (discussing the non-
binding nature of the ILO Declaration).
102. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3 (2011),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 27–56.
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published a document in late 2016 known as the National Action Plan.
105
Like the European Union, the U.S. supports the UNGP and the OECD
Guidelines.
106
The National Action Plan is comprised of five elements.
The first National Action Plan element, labeled “Leading by Example,”
speaks to U.S. support for various international initiatives that the U.S. has
and will continue to support, such as the Inter-American Convention against
Corruption and the OECD’s anti-bribery monitoring program.
107
Many of
the components of the first element (and the other four elements as well) are
vague or simply restate existing U.S. obligations.
108
The second element, labeled “Collaborating with Stakeholders,” describes
the U.S. government’s efforts to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among
businesses and other stakeholders, such as employees and other
stakeholders.
109
Examples given of such collaboration are the Fair Labor
Association, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
110
The third element, “Facilitating RBC by Companies,” outlines the
government’s production and dissemination of relevant information to
encourage businesses to comply with the CSR programs such as the UNGP
and OECD Guidelines.
111
In large part, the information produced under this
element is intended to allow U.S. corporations to examine how international
business partners are complying with various CSR guidelines, such as
105. U.S. Dep’t of State, RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT FIRSTNATIONALACTION
PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2016) [hereinafter NATIONAL ACTION
PLAN], https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265918.pdf.
106. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., U.S. GOVERNMENT
APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3–5 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 STATE
DEPARTMENTREPORT]; see also NATIONALACTION PLAN, supra note 105, at 5.
107. NATIONALACTION PLAN, supra note 105, at 7–12.
108. See, e.g., Int’l Corp. Accountability Roundtable, Assessment of the United States
National Action Plan (NAP) on Responsible Business Conduct 2 (2017), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/58da9da11b10e3e2a23498
3c/1490722210495/US+NAP+assessment+FINAL.pdf [hereinafter ICAR Critique]
(discussing how the absence of significant new, material obligations in the National
Action Plan has been noted by a number of international organizations); id. (“One
negative aspect of the U.S. NAP is that many of the government action points are overly
vague, making it difficult to discern the concrete steps the NAP is committing specific
government agencies or ministries to take. This difficulty hampers the ability for
stakeholders, including internal government actors, to hold responsible government
entities accountable for their commitments. Moreover, the NAP is strongly lacking in
commitments to new regulatory measures.”).
109. NATIONALACTION PLAN, supra note 105, at 13–16.
110. Id. at 13.
111. See id. at 17 (stating that the government produces various reports on subjects
such as human rights, labor rights, commercial conditions, investment conditions, and
company information).
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eliminating child labor and complying with anti-bribery standards.
112
The fourth element, “Recognizing Positive Performance,” is a pledge to
reward companies that achieve CSR objectives.
113
The fifth element, “Providing Access to Remedy,” reiterates the UNGP
requirement of establishing a process by which victims of human rights
abuses can petition for redress.
114
The National Action Plan states that the
U.S. will continue to support the grievance procedures in the OECD
Guidelines and the World Bank’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative.
115
Overall, while the National Action Plan sets out a wide range of CSR
related goals, it mostly speaks of existing programs with very little in the
way of new laws or regulations that would compel CSR activity by U.S.
corporations.
C. CSR Compliance by Corporations
CSR compliance is a mix of voluntary adoption of CSR programs by
corporations and mandatory reporting on individual corporation
performance of specified CSR guidelines. The European Union recently
implemented such mandatory reporting obligations on certain publicly
traded companies, with the reports being a required element of each
company’s annual report to shareholders.
116
While the mandatory reporting
scheme goes further than any prior regulatory scheme, it is rife with
loopholes and has no penalties for non-compliance.
117
Some member-states
of the European Union have adopted laws implementing CSR through
socially responsible investing initiatives.
118
Belgium, for example, prohibits
112. Id. at 8–9, 17–21.
113. Id. at 22.
114. See id. at 23 (discussing the remedies that victims of human rights abuses can
seek).
115. Id.
116. Directive 2014/95/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2014 on Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-
Financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups (L 330)
6, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0095
(stating that this directive requires public companies that have more than 500 employees
to provide information on environmental, social and workers’ concerns as well as reports
on measures relating to human rights and corruption).
117. Jerome Chapalier, EU to Force Large Companies to Report on Environmental
and Social Impacts, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/eu-reform-listed-companies-report-environmental-social-impact.
118. REINHARD STEURER, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: CHARACTERISING PUBLIC POLICIES ON CSR IN EUROPE 13 (2010),
https://www.wiso.boku.ac.at/fileadmin/data/H03000/H73000/H73200/InFER_Discussi
on_Papers/InFER_DP_10_2_The_Role_of_Governments_in_Coporate_Social_Respon
sibility_Characterising_Public_Policies_on_CSR_in__Europe.pdf.
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investments in companies involved in the production of certain weapons
including cluster munitions.
119
In the U.S., certain CSR principles have been incorporated into a handful
of federal
120
and state
121
laws, but for the most part CSR compliance and
reporting is entirely voluntary. Indeed, the International Corporate
Accountability Roundtable criticized the National Action Plan for being
“heavily skewed towards voluntary measures, guidance, trainings, outreach,
funding, and dialogue, and is severely lacking in commitments to new
regulatory measures . . . .”
122
i. Trends in CSR Reporting by Corporations
In 2017, KPMG International Cooperative conducted a survey on CSR
reporting by the world’s largest companies and found that approximately 75
percent of the companies included in the study issue CSR reports of some
nature.
123
For companies in the survey that were domiciled in the U.S., the
rate of reporting was 81 percent.
124
These data are overall figures based on
a general definition of CSR for four subject areas: climate change, U.N.
Sustainable Development Goals, human rights, and carbon emissions.
125
119. Id.
120. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2018) (requiring
disclosure of risks related to climate change in filings by companies); 19 U.S.C. § 3901
(2018) (noting that perhaps the best-known law that reflects CSR principles is regulation
on “conflict diamonds”); 31 C.F.R. § 537.311 (2016) repealed by Exec. Order 13742, 3
C.F.R. § 13742 (Oct. 7, 2016) (discussing that in 1997 the federal government enacted a
reporting requirement on investments in, and sanctions on, Burma); Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1504 (2010)
(repealed 2017) (requiring public companies report on payments made to foreign
governments in an attempt to curb corruption related to oil, gas and mining activities);
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-9106, 34-61469, FR-82, (Feb. 8, 2010).
121. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §1714.43 (West 2019) (requiring large retailers and
manufacturers doing business in the state to disclose how they act to eliminate slavery
and human trafficking in their supply chains).
122. ICAR Critique, supra note 108, at 8, 13 (“The new action points in the NAP are
almost entirely voluntary. Of the new actions only one clearly involves regulation, and
it is arguably not a commitment to new action . . . . Apart from this one action, the new
commitments in the NAP are heavily focused on providing guidance, tools, trainings,
and funding; convening and entering into dialogue with other stakeholders; and
continuing to implement existing laws and policies . . . . While these new commitments
are welcome, without pairing these efforts with legal demands and mandatory measures
on companies, they are insufficient to drive real change.”).
123. KPMG INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE, The Road Ahead: The KPMG Survey of
Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017 4 (2017), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/
kpmg/be/pdf/2017/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.pdf.
124. Id. at 22.
125. Id. at 2.
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Looking solely at companies comprising the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index,
the Governance and Accountability Institute found that 85 percent of the
companies in the index reported on corporate responsibility and
sustainability in 2017.
126
The lack of uniformity in CSR standards, however, renders CSR reporting
data sui generis in many cases. TheHarvard Business Review examined this
problem and noted that the criteria making up CSR ranking systems have
extreme variability not only in what criteria are included, but also how each
is weighted.
127
Furthermore, the question of whether criteria have been
satisfied is often difficult to answer and the underlying data are often
unreliable.
128
In other words, under two different CSR ranking systems the
same company could have diametrically opposed results due to the
underlying ranking methodology variability. Because of this, it is difficult
to accurately assess the impact of CSR programs in a manner that would lead
one to be able to determine that one corporation’s CSR program is more
effective than another corporation’s program.
129
Unless and until a uniform
system of terms, measurements, and criteria are adopted, CSR ratings will
generally have very little practical use.
A uniform system of terms, measurements, and criteria for CSR ratings
might look similar to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”)
and International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”). By way of
comparison, GAAP and IFRS have made the preparation and analysis of
financial statements reliable and uniform, facilitating the preparation of
accurate financial statements and allowing a wide range of constituencies to
examine those statements to understand the financial condition of the
reporting corporation.
130
ISO 26000 may be the starting point for a CSR
126. Flash Report: 85% of S&P 500 Index Companies Publish Sustainability Reports
in 2017, GOVERNANCE ANDACCOUNTABILITY INST., https://www.ga-institute.com/press-
releases/article/flash-report-85-of-sp-500-indexR-companies-publish-sustainability-
reports-in-2017.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
127. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 78,
81 (2006).
128. Id.
129. See N.M. NASRULLAH & M.M. RAHIM, CSR IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EVIDENCES FROM THE READY-MADE GARMENTS INDUSTRY IN
BANGLADESH 11 (2014) (“In defining CSR, there is no overall agreement or consensus.
There is a lack of an all embracing definition. Moreover, there is no universal definition
of CSR. As a result, there remains an uncertainty about what CSR exactly is; how it can
be defined accurately or conclusively. The reason may be rooted in its interchangeable
and overlapping character with other terminologies . . . .”).
130. SeeDaniel Tschopp &Michael Nastanski, The Harmonization and Convergence
of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting Standards, 125 J. BUS. ETHICS 147, 147
(2014) (suggesting that the Global Reporting Initiative be the basis for a standardized
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analog to GAAP or IFRS, but because it is merely guidance, and has not been
uniformly adopted, it is nothing more than a starting point.
ii. How Corporations Implement CSR Programs
On a macro level, it may be difficult to compare CSR rankings among
various corporations, but it is possible to conduct useful analysis on
corporate CSR compliance when one set of criteria is applied to a sufficient
sample size. To this end, third party service providers create CSR
compliance methodologies and then apply those methodologies to a wide
range of corporations.
131
The reports that are produced from these studies
are then used by investors, stakeholders, and governments to measure CSR
performance. To illustrate the workings of these third-party CSR reports,
this Article will briefly review two of the largest third-party service providers
for CSR evaluation:
132
MSCI ESG Research, LLC
133
(“MSCI”) and ISS-
Ethix
134
(“ISS-Ethix”).
MSCI has designed its rankings systems for use by investors who use CSR
ratings, in whole or part, to screen potential investments as well as
investments already in their portfolios.
135
MSCI ranks a corporation on a
scale of AAA to CCC, with AAA being the highest rating and CCC being
CSR reporting mechanism).
131. What Is a CSR Assessment?, ECOVADIS, https://www.ecovadis.com/us/csr-
assessment/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
132. See generally ESG Reports and Ratings: What They Are, Why They Matter?,
DAVIS POLK&WARDWELL (July 12, 2017), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2017-07-
12_esg_reports_ratings_what_they_are_why_they_matter_0.pdf.
133. MSCI, ESG Integration, http://www.msci.com/esg-integration, (last visited Feb.
9, 2020) (noting that MSCI ESG Research LLC (“MSCI”) is a subsidiary of MSCI, Inc.,
a provider of financial market index and portfolio tools).
134. See ISS, Ethix Clients to Receive Integrated Environmental, Social, and
Governance (ESG) Solutions, ISS GOVERNANCE (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.iss
governance.com/ethix-sri-advisors-acquired-by-institutional-shareholder-services-in-
responsible-investment-business-expansion/ (discussing Institutional Shareholder
Services, Inc. (“ISS”), acquisition of Scandinavian Ethix SRI Advisors AB in 2015 and
subsequent renaming to ISS-Ethix); What Sets ISS Apart, ISS GOVERNANCE,
https://www.issgovernance.com/about/about-iss/ (stating that ISS is the largest domestic
and global proxy advisory, specializing in providing institutional investors with advice
on corporate governance and shareholder voting matters); see also James R. Copland et
al., The Big Thumb on the Scale: An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry, ROCK
CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY CLOSER LOOK
SERIES: RESEARCH PAPERNO. 18-27 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188174.
135. ESG Ratings Methodology: Executive Summary, MSCI (Feb. 2017) (noting how
raw data are collected, reviewed under specific CSR criteria, and ultimately rated on a
defined scale) (obtained by the author anonymously from MSCI in researching this
article) (on file with author).
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the lowest.
136
Ratings are not absolute; rather, they are determined relative
to the performance of corporations that are deemed to be industry peer
corporations.
137
Each corporation is ranked on thirty-seven key CSR
issues
138
that roll up into one of three categories: Environmental, Social, or
Governance.
139
Here, it should be noted that MSCI does not include a
“human rights” category, yet, as will be demonstrated later in this Article,
activists who misuse CSR standards often base their discriminatory goals on
the claim that illusory human rights norms are being violated.
140
Using
publicly available data, media reports, and specialized datasets, MSCI first
assigns a raw score for each CSR issue for a given corporation, and then each
issue is assigned a weight, and a weighted average score is determined. The
weighted average scored is then normalized within each industry and using
a three-year average for all members of a particular industry, a corporation’s
rank (AAA to CCC) is calculated to show investors how the corporation
compares to its peers in each of the thirty-seven categories. Throughout the
process, subject corporations are invited to provide feedback on the facts
contained in each report.
ISS-Ethix also uses a proprietary CSR ranking methodology. For
purposes of this Article, the focus will be on the type of ranking related to
what ISS-Ethix calls “Norms-Based Research.”
141
Norms-Based Research
reflects the principles in the UNGC and covers over 15,000 publicly traded
corporations.
142
Through Norms-Based Research, ISS-Ethix investigates
allegations that a corporation has violated UNGC principles and uses two
inter-related ranking systems.
143
The first system consists of a “traffic light”
spectrum, where red represents a verified failure to abide by the applicable
136. MSCI, ESG Ratings, https://www.msci.com/esg-ratings (last visited Feb. 9,
2020).
137. See ERIC MOEN, MSCI ESG RATINGS 3 (2018), https://www.msci.com/docu
ments/1296102/1636401/MSCI+ESG+Rating+Brochure-V3.pdf/f2b4a27a-58f5-42c7-
880b-cf8201039eaa.
138. Included in the thirty-seven key CSR issues are carbon emissions, toxic waste
emissions, land use, labor management, product safety, business ethics, and corruption.
139. Within the Environmental category are climate change, natural resources,
pollution and waste and environmental opportunities. Within the Social category are
human capital, product liability, stakeholder opposition, and social opportunities. Within
the governance category are corporate governance and corporate behavior.
140. See infra pp. 340–41; see discussion infra Section V.B.ii.
141. ISS-ETHIX, AN INTRODUCTION TO NORM-BASED RESEARCH (June 2017),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/products/ISS-Ethix-Norm-Based-Research-Meth
odology-Process.pdf?elqTrackId=380c3f4392324ff7a06f5d173491355c&elq=69d0f1c
2d6fa403298d5aaecb7982606&elqaid=669&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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norm and green represents no current failure to abide by the applicable
norm.
144
The second system is a score between one and ten, corresponding
to the traffic light spectrum between red and green.
145
A numerical score of
ten represents the highest level of a failure to abide by a norm while a score
of one represents no allegations that the norm has been violated.
146
Thus, if
a company is given a ranking of amber/5, it ranks in the middle of the failure
to abide by a norm spectrum and is said to be “under observation.”
147
A
company given a ranking of green/1 is not alleged to have violated a norm,
while a company with a red/10 ranking has a verified failure to abide by an
established norm.
148
ISS-Ethix begins its evaluation by monitoring over 4,000 publicly
available sources of what it deems “controversial corporate news” for
potential violations of the UNGC or the OECD Guidelines within either the
Human/Labor Rights, Labor Standards, Environment, or Anti-Corruption
categories.
149
Once a potential violation has been detected, ISS-Ethix
determines the nature of the violation (whether it is severe, systematic, or
systemic) and the level of complicity for the subject company.
150
From there,
ISS-Ethix confirms that the alleged violation is of a recent date and then
determines whether there has been reliable information provided to support
the allegation of a violation.
151
By way of example, one of the norms ISS-Ethix ranks companies on is
“failure to respect the right to self-determination,” which ISS-Ethix says is
rooted in UNGC principles and OECD Guidelines IV.
152
To determine
whether this norm has been violated by a company, ISS-Ethix looks into
whether the company “benefit[s] from the suppression of a people’s rights,
when this people is under colonial or comparable rule (such as indigenous
groups, a population under occupation).
153
This category applies when a
company is complicit in the dispossession of these peoples.”
154
Similarly,
the norm of “forced displacement” will be deemed to have been violated if a
there is “forced displacement of communities to make way for a large scale
144. Id. at 1–2.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 7.
151. Id. at 7–8.
152. Id. at 16.
153. Id.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
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project the company is involved in.”
155
It is crucial to note here that for these
two human rights norms, the company itself has to be complicit in the
purported violation of human rights.
156
If a third party, including a
government, is the party allegedly violating human rights, a company
operating in the midst of the locale would not be complicit without some
form of tangible action between the government and the company, such as
would be the case if a company lobbied a government to displace indigenous
people to allow the company to build a dam on the land traditionally
occupied by such people.
157
This point becomes particularly relevant in the
section of this Article titled “CSR Programs that Advance Discriminatory
and Unlawful Initiatives: A Case Study.”
158
D. Can CSR Co-exist with the Shareholder Primacy Norm?
On its face, CSR, as the embodiment of stakeholder theory, would seem
to be incompatible with the shareholder primacy norm, especially under the
radical expression of the norm. This result is mandated only if one rigidly
views CSR as requiring the board of directors of a Traditional Corporation
to subordinate shareholder interests to the social responsibility agenda. In
fact, though, it is possible, at least theoretically, for CSR to exist as a
secondary consideration of the board, one that is considered only to the
extent it does not interfere with the board’s obligation to maximize
shareholder value.
In jurisdictions outside of the U.S. where the shareholder primacy norm is
not the controlling theory, it is certainly possible for CSR to thrive as a
corporate policy that takes precedence over maximizing shareholder wealth,
even at corporations with publicly traded securities. Scholars at the Institut
Européen d’Administration des Affaires recently published a paper
examining the possibility of how CSR could be implemented in a way that
does not violate shareholder primacy norms.
159
One theory covered in that
paper resulted in “the integration of social, ethical, and ecological aspects
into business operations and decision-making, provided it contributes to the
financial bottom line.”
160
The Article examines CSR in the context of a
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id.
158. See infra Section V.B.i.
159. See N. Craig Smith & David Rönnergard, Shareholder Primacy, Corporate
Social Responsibility, and the Role of Business Schools, 134 J. BUS. ETHICS 463, 463
(2016) (advocating for the extension of fiduciary duties and changes in business school
teaching).
160. See id. at 464 (citing M. Van Marrewijk, Concepts and Definitions of CSR and
Corporate Sustainability: Between Agency and Communion, 44 J. BUS. ETHICS 95, 102
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system where shareholder wealth maximization constrains the board of
directors of a Traditional Corporation and notes that this expression of the
shareholder primacy norm necessarily relegates CSR initiatives to a strategic
role, where CSR must satisfy a “business case” that results in shareholder
wealth appreciation, rather than the provision of benefits to non-shareholder
constituencies.
161
Other scholars have proposed theories under which a Traditional
Corporation’s board of directors can fulfill their duties to the corporation and
shareholders while still advancing a CSR agenda that conflicts with the
shareholder primacy norm. One of the leading scholars promoting this view
is Professor Lynn Stout, who argues that not only is the traditional
understanding of the shareholder primacy norm requiring the board to
maximize shareholder value a fiction, but it is also harmful to corporations
and shareholders.
162
Professor Stout deems the wealth maximization
language in Dodge v. Ford and its progeny “mere dicta”
163
and tries to
explain away decades of judicial opinions and scholarly works that build on
this language with distinctions that are nothing more than a scholarly dance
upon the head of a pin. For example, Professor Stout claims that the Revlon
doctrine is an exception, rather than the rule, when it comes to shareholder
wealth maximization and goes on to counter the established understanding
of board conduct by asserting that a board of directors can essentially waste
corporate assets under the protection of the business judgment rule in all
cases other than one where a public company is being taken private:
As long as [directors] do not take those assets for themselves, they can
give them to charity; spend them on raises and health care for employees;
refuse to pay dividends so as to build up a cash cushion that benefits
creditors; and pursue low-profit projects that benefit the community,
society, or the environment. They can do all these things even if the result
is to decrease—not increase—shareholder value.
164
Professor Stout, here, engages in what Chief Justice Strine described as
dream world “wish-fulfilment” (with the dream being progressive
stakeholder theory supplanting the shareholder primacy norm).
165
Professor Thomas Clarke similarly has argued that concerns such as
(2003)) (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 465.
162. See STOUT, supra note 60, at 24–32, 48.
163. Id. at 26.
164. Id. at 31.
165. The Dangers of Denial, supra note 48; see also Sublime Myths, supra note 46
(disagreeing with the substance of Professor Stout’s arguments and pointing out that she
makes a fundamental error in describing shareholder primacy as law, and further
defending the shareholder primacy ideology as well-based in law and tradition).
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climate change have broadened the scope of the duties of the board of
directors of a Traditional Corporation to the point that a “reevaluation of
fiduciary duty is presently taking place and will prove to be profound.”
166
To support this position, Professor Clarke argues that climate change is not
just an environmental concern for certain groups, it can have a direct impact
on the financial condition of a company if that company has not prepared to
mitigate the risks inherent in climate change theory.
167
To that end, Professor
Clarke argues, a board of directors that manages the corporation to minimize
the corporation’s contributions to climate change will help the corporation
to minimize the costs it incurs to remediate those contributions and avoid
regulatory penalties, all of which work to increase shareholder wealth.
168
Ultimately, however, the position that board actions that ignore
shareholder wealth maximization in favor of the promotion of third-party
stakeholder interests are a proper corporate goal is a fringe, aspirational
position, rather than a reflection of what the law and weight of scholarship
articulate.
169
The esteemed economist, Milton Friedman, provided the most succinct
theory of the corporation and strongly implied that CSR has no place in a
traditional corporation other than as a means to the end of wealth
maximization: “In [a free economy] there is one and only one social
responsibility of business―to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the
game . . . .”
170
Nonetheless, there is a perverse accuracy to the position
166. Thomas Clarke, The Widening Scope of Directors’ Duties: The Increasing
Impact of Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
531, 570 (2016).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 549, 570 (emphasizing the financial and strategic importance of board
action on environmental matters that include pollution prevention resulting in lower costs
and sustainability, help to pre-empt competitors, and position the company for future
growth).
169. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365, 372 (2010) (finding that corporate
funding of political messages is protected by the First Amendment); see Leo E. Strine &
Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative
Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 390 (2015)
(noting how Citizens United has been inaccurately described as giving personhood rights
to corporations and that if the case is read to provide corporations with rights of natural
persons, it should also impose on them the corresponding social obligations of natural
persons, which would support the stakeholder theory over the shareholder primacy
norm). But see Bainbridge, supra note 31, at 40–41 (noting that Citizens United has not
unmoored corporations from regulatory oversight as Strine argued and moreover,
corporate law theory still favors shareholder primacy over CSR).
170. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (University of Chicago
Press, 40th Anniversary ed. 2002).
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espoused by Professor Stout. While there is no question that the shareholder
primacy norm precludes the implementation of CSR other than as a strategy
to increase shareholder wealth, as a practical matter courts tend to take a
passive approach to board abdication of their duties, often relying on
shareholders to provide redress through director elections and applying the
business judgment rule so broadly as to rubber-stamp virtually all board
action. While the fact that courts have been hesitant to hold directors
accountable for their wrongful elevation of CSR principles above
shareholder interests does not vest that practice with any legal foundation, it
is also true that in many applications the business judgment rule serves as an
uncodified judicial loophole allowing a board to divert corporate assets to
third parties so long as the board action can be justified as being reasonable
at some de minimis level.
171
If courts have been reluctant, absent statutory guidance, to second guess
boards to determine when CSR activity crosses into murky corporate law
waters, one established method that courts have used to decide similar
questions, and that could apply in the context of questionable CSR activity,
is the doctrine of corporate waste.
The traditional definition of corporate waste is a transaction where “what
the corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person of
ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what the
corporation has paid.”
172
While claims of corporate waste have been made
for a wide range of matters, the most typical subjects of the claims are
excessive compensation, charitable donations, and political contributions.
173
171. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006)
(“[W]here the business judgment [rule] presumptions are applicable, the board’s decision
will be upheld unless it cannot be attributed to any rational business purpose.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business
Judgment Rule, 14 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 27, 62 (2017) (explaining how scholars such as
Professor Stout advance extremist theories that use the business judgment rule to protect
directors who undermine the rights of shareholders in favor of non-shareholder
constituencies); Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as An Immunity Doctrine,
4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 521, 535, 571 (2013) (arguing that because the business
judgment rule is not codified, it has become amorphous as a legal standard and even puts
the burden on plaintiffs, rather than directors as defendants, and positing that the proper
implementation of the rule would require directors to first establish that they have met
the preconditions to the rule before being allowed to claim it for immunity, essentially
shifting the burden to directors, rather than aggrieved shareholders); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83,
128 (2004) (contending that the business judgment rule is actually a doctrine that has
allowed courts to abstain from reviewing director action, rather than review that action
to determine whether it was made with the requisite process to establish that the board
was acting for legitimate and rational business purposes).
172. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
173. Harwell Wells, The Life (and Death?) of Corporate Waste, 74 WASH. & LEE L.
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The most logical analog to CSR initiatives of the three classic examples of
corporate waste would be charitable donations, and it is here that a workable
limitation on CSR activity can be discerned. In the typical case, a corporate
charitable contribution will be found to not constitute corporate waste if it is
“reasonable.”
174
This is, on its own, a nearly useless definition due to the
numerous possible definitions of “reasonable,” but Delaware courts provided
specific guidance when they tied the determination of “reasonable” to the
amount of the contribution that the corporation could deduct under the
federal tax code.
175
The import of this is to demonstrate that while charitable
giving in general is motivated by altruism, for a corporation, charitable
giving has to be tied to a tangible and quantifiable financial benefit that the
corporation and its shareholders receive.
176
A similar standard should be
assumed to exist with regard to CSR (as the shareholder primacy normwould
require).
Furthermore, if a board of directors of a Traditional Corporation were to
commit the company to a CSR program that effectively used company assets
to advance the board’s own desires to promote causes without shareholder
ratification, a claim of conversion could be colorable. Under Delaware law,
“the necessary elements for a conversion . . . are that a plaintiff had a
property interest in the converted goods; that the plaintiff had a right to
possession of the goods; and that the plaintiff sustained damages.”
177
Conversion in Delaware has also been described as “any distinct act of
dominion wrongfully exerted over the property of another, in denial of [the
plaintiff’s] right, or inconsistent with it.”
178
While it may be unprecedented
for a shareholder to claim that the board of directors of a Traditional
Corporation has tortiously converted the corporation’s assets for the
director’s own benefit by adopting a CSR program, it would not be without
legal foundation. Delaware law restricts tortious conversion claims to
situations where the property does not consist of cash and further limits
claims that are associated with contract rights (requiring that the plaintiff’s
right to the property arose from an obligation not governed by that contract,
as such a claim would be based on a theory of breach of contract, rather than
REV. 1239, 1249–50 (2017).
174. Theodora Holding Corp. v Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
175. Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991).
176. See Theodora Holding Corp., 257 A.2d at 405 (explaining that when looking at
the reasonableness of a charitable donation by a corporation the IRS deduction limitation
is a helpful guide).
177. Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 542 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1988).
178. Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 168 A. 87, 93 (Del. 1933).
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conversion).
179
Obligations and duties of the board of directors of a
Traditional Corporation are governed by statute and common law, except in
the specific circumstances where a contract right is asserted,
180
so if the
shareholders could demonstrate that the complained-of CSR program
constituted an act of dominion by the board of directors that was inconsistent
with the rights the shareholders had in corporate assets, a conversion claim
would be viable.
What this means for CSR programs at Traditional Corporations is that
where a CSR initiative can be shown to either have no material negative
effect or is reasonably expected to have an overall benefit to the value of
shareholder investments in the corporation, that company’s directors are on
firm legal footing in adopting the initiative. The decision, however, cannot
be based on mere speculation or attenuated theories that depend on magical
thinking or a horizon of such indeterminate duration as to make the results
of the action impossible to determine.
181
By way of example, the board of directors of an automobile manufacturer
might review a plan to introduce a new type of vehicle that is claimed to have
significant environmental benefits. There will be significant start-up costs
for the new vehicle line, but based on deliberative market research and
financial analysis, the board is informed that within a set and realistic
timeframe the new vehicle division is expected to have sales that provide
sufficient revenue to pay the start-up expenses and achieve a level of
profitability that is at least as substantial as could have been achieved through
other investments of corporate assets. In such a case, even though a
component of the board’s decision was for the benefit of non-shareholder
constituencies, the board will not have violated their duties to the corporation
and its shareholders.
179. Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 889–90 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(dismissing conversion claim that was duplicative of breach of contract claim); see also
Khushaim v. Tullow Inc., No. N15C-11-212-PRW, 2016 WL 3594752, at *21–23 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2016).
180. For example, some corporations are bound by agreements with shareholders
relating to when and how the shareholders can sell stock issued by the corporation. If
the board of directors of the corporation were to violate the terms of a shareholders’
agreement in a manner that deprived the shareholder of property rights, it would be a
situation where both a conversion and a breach of contract claim might stand. Kuroda,
971 A.2d at 889–90 (highlighting that although the defendant was an LLC rather than a
corporation, the legal principles on conversion and breach of contract claims against a
business entity are equally applicable).
181. See Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (“The
presumptive validity of a business judgment is rebutted in those rare cases where the
decision under attack is ‘so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems
essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.’”).
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Contrast the foregoing example with a decision by the board of directors
of that same automobile manufacturer to refuse to do business with a country
that is one of the company’s prime markets but is under attack by
environmental activists for contributing to environmental harms. The board
has been pressured by activists to divest from and refuse to conduct business
in the country with the theory that if put under enough economic pressure,
the country will change its way. If the company does as the activists’
demand, it will lose ten percent of global automobile sales and it will also
incur higher costs to relocate manufacturing and research facilities from that
country to one that is not being targeted by activists. The only business
justification given to the board of directors for adopting the CSR initiative to
blacklist the country is that such action might bolster the company’s
reputation among consumers who are environmental activists and, at some
point in the future, if the campaign is successful, the country will reduce the
harm it causes to the environment, which might provide benefits to a wide
range of non-shareholder constituencies. These considerations are entirely
speculative, as opposed to the sum-certain costs to the company of lower
sales and relocation expenses. In this case, if the board nonetheless adopts
the CSR initiative, it will have violated its duties to the corporation and its
shareholders.
182
IV. BENEFITCORPORATIONS AND THE FUTURE OFCORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAMS.
As adoption of CSR programs has expanded, states realized that there was
a need for a corporate structure to fill the gap between non-profit
corporations and Traditional Corporations. The co-founder of B Lab,
183
a
leader in the Benefit Corporation movement, summarized the problem as:
[c]urrently, individuals and groups seeking to establish organizations with
a public mission can either organize themselves as not-for-profit
corporations, or use a traditional for-profit corporate form. In the case of
non-profits, there are numerous restrictions on the nature of their
activities, and non-profits are thus extremely limited in their ability to
attract capital to allow them to achieve their mission at scale. In the case
of traditional for profit corporations, such businesses are generally
required under the current statutory and case law to be conducted for the
benefit of the shareholders to whom the directors owe a fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder value, thus limiting their ability to consider the
182. See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text (deciding to take action that is not
going to directly maximize shareholder value of in the corporation).
183. See discussion supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing B Lab).
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interests of their employees, communities, or the environment.
184
A. Overview of Benefit Corporation Status.
The Benefit Corporation first came into existence in the U.S. in late 2010
when the State of Maryland
185
used a Model Benefit Corporation code
produced in connection with the non-profit B Lab
186
to create a new, hybrid
entity that at once could pursue social benefits, much like a non-profit
corporation, while still working to provide profits to its shareholders.
187
In certain basic ways, Benefit Corporations and traditional corporations
(both for-profit and non-profit) share a common core in that they are all
creatures of state corporation codes. To wit,
[t]he benefit corporation laws of each state position the benefit corporation
statutory regime within the context of the state’s general corporations law,
unlike the flexible purpose corporation (FPC), which has been adopted as
a standalone entity with no necessary relationship to the general
corporations law. This is advantageous for the benefit corporation because
it allows each state’s body of corporate governance law—most of which
is useful to the operation of any business—to still apply to benefit
corporations. Moreover, it allows the benefit corporation’s body of
corporate governance law to interact with and, to the extent that they are
consistent, be updated by the cases and developments in other areas of the
state’s corporate governance law. While the benefit corporation statute is
new, and therefore inheres some legal risk in the uncertainty of how courts
will interpret the statute, there is, arguably, comparatively much less risk
184. Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic
Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J.
999, 1012 (2013) (quoting Jay Coen Gilbert, Remarks on White/Leach Benefit
Corporation Bill upon Introduction to the Pennsylvania State Senate 1 (Feb. 7, 2011)).
185. FAQ, B LAB (Mar. 9, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://benefitcorp.net/faq.
186. See generally MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION CODE (B LAB 2017) [hereinafter
MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION CODE] https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model
%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legislation_4_16.pdf.
187. See About B Lab, FLYNNER DESIGN + BUILD, http://www.flynnerhomes.com/
about-us/bcorp (last visited Aug. 18, 2019) (“[A] nonprofit organization dedicated to
using the power of business to solve social and environmental problems. B Lab drives
systemic change through three interrelated initiatives: 1) building a community of
Certified B Corporations to make it easier for all of us to tell the difference between
‘good companies’ and just good marketing; 2) accelerating the growth of impact
investing through use of B Lab’s GIIRS Ratings and Analytics platform; and 3)
promoting legislation creating a new corporate form – the benefit corporation – that
meets higher standards of corporate purpose, accountability, and transparency.”); see
also The Model Legislation, BENEFITCORP, https://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-
legislation (last visited Aug. 18, 2019) (explaining that a Benefit Corporation is formed
under state law, totally unrelated to B Lab, though the model legislation that is the basis
for most Benefit Corporation legislation was promulgated in connection with efforts by
B Lab).
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than in an FPC because the benefit corporation statute still sits upon the
bedrock of the remainder of the corporate governance laws.
188
While a Benefit Corporation is also a for-profit corporation, it differs from
a Traditional Corporation in that the shareholder primacy norm has been
statutorily written out of its governance. Instead of focusing on maximizing
shareholder value, the board of directors of a Benefit Corporation is required
to consider the effects of its decisions on a range of constituencies that can
include employees, suppliers, customers, communities, society as a whole,
and the environment.
189
The drafters of the Model Benefit Corporation Code saw the duty to
maximize profits as a relic of Traditional Corporation corporate governance
and acted to unshackle Benefit Corporations from solely pecuniary goals and
explicitly rejected shareholder primacy caselaw such as Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co. and eBay v. Craigslist.
190
The comment to Section 301(a)(1) of
the Model Benefit Corporation Code states:
[t]his section is at the heart of what it means to be a benefit corporation.
By requiring the consideration of interests of constituencies other than the
shareholders, the section rejects the holdings in Dodge v. Ford . . . and
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark . . . that directors must
maximize the financial value of a corporation.
191
While a Traditional Corporation usually has few limitations on corporate
purpose, a Benefit Corporation is, by its nature, required to fulfill prescribed
corporate goals. A Benefit Corporation is limited to creating a general public
benefit, typically defined as “[a] material positive impact on society and the
environment, taken as a whole, from the business and operations of a benefit
corporation taking into account the impacts of the benefit corporation as
reported against a third-party standard.”
192
In addition to the general public
benefit purpose, a Benefit Corporation can list additional specific purposes,
and the Model Benefit Corporation Code lists the following as possible
specific purposes:
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities
with beneficial products or services;
(2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities
beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business;
188. Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 181, at 1033.
189. Model Benefit Corp. Code § 301(a)(1) (B Lab 2017).
190. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684–85 (Mich. 1919) (requiring a
corporation to distribute excess profits to shareholders); see also eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33–34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (rejecting the notion that
the corporation can put aiding communities over shareholder value).
191. Model Benefit Corp. Code § 301 cmt.
192. Id. § 102.
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(3) protecting or restoring the environment;
(4) improving human health;
(5) promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge;
(6) increasing the flow of capital to entities with a purpose to benefit
society or the environment; and
(7) conferring any other particular benefit on society or the
environment.
193
To further distance the Benefit Corporation from the shareholder primacy
norm, “[t]he Model [Benefit Corporation Code] explicitly states that ‘[t]he
creation of a general public benefit and specific public benefit . . . is in the
best interests of the benefit corporation.’ This serves to protect against the
presumption that the financial interests of the corporation take precedence
over the public benefit purposes, which maximizes the benefit corporation’s
flexibility in corporate decision-making.”
194
Not only does a Benefit Corporation have to specify in its certificate of
incorporation the benefits that it is obligated to perform, but it must also
provide an annual report on its progress in performing those benefits
195
that
includes an analysis of the Benefit Corporation’s performance of its social
benefit goals compared to a third-party standard for performance. The
comments to the Model Benefit Corporation Code’s definition of “third-
party standard” describes the obligation as follows:
The requirement in section 401 that a benefit corporation prepare an
annual benefit report that assesses its performance in creating general
public benefit against a third-party standard provides an important
protection against the abuse of benefit corporation status. The
performance of a regular business corporation is measured by the financial
statements that the corporation prepares. But the performance of a benefit
corporation in creating general or specific public benefit will not be
readily apparent from those financial statements. The annual benefit
report is intended to permit an evaluation of that performance so that the
shareholders can judge how the directors have discharged their
responsibility to manage the corporation and thus whether the directors
should be retained in office or the shareholders should take other action to
193. Id.
194. William H. Clark & Larry Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the Benefit
Corporation: Why it is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Needs of Social
Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public, BENEFITCORP 17 (2013),
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf
(emphasis added).
195. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. CODE § 401 (requiring each Benefit Corporation to
prepare and publicly publish an annual report consisting of a narrative describing the
progress made in providing the stated benefit as well as a report that measures the Benefit
Corporation’s progress against a third-party standard).
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change the way the corporation is managed. The annual benefit report is
also intended to reduce “greenwashing” (the phenomenon of businesses
seeking to portray themselves as being more environmentally and socially
responsible than they actually are) by giving consumers and the general
public a means of judging whether a business is living up to its claimed
status as a benefit corporation.
196
This requirement, and the admonition to avoid “greenwashing” activity, is
consistent with stakeholder theory and addresses concerns some have raised
about CSR programs.
197
Additionally, a Benefit Corporation may have a
“Benefit Director,” a member of the board of directors responsible for
preparing an opinion describing any failures of the board or officers to fulfill
their obligations in providing the Benefit Corporation’s stated benefits.
198
In the event that a Benefit Corporation fails to properly pursue its stated
benefit, the Model Benefit Corporation Code provides for a “benefit
enforcement proceeding” as a remedy.
199
A “benefit enforcement
proceeding” can be initiated by either the Benefit Corporation itself or by
shareholders derivatively.
200
As a further protection, a Benefit Corporation
cannot change its status as a Benefit Corporation without the affirmative vote
of two-thirds of the Benefit Corporation’s shareholders.
201
The penalty for a
failure to fulfill the purpose of a Benefit Corporation includes, but is not
limited to, a “benefit enforcement proceeding,” which could conceivably
include intervention by the state’s attorney general to compel performance
of the Benefit Corporation’s stated beneficial purpose.
202
Overall, Benefit Corporation governance procedures provide a guarantee
that the entity will be guided by a commitment to public benefit over profit
that is at least as robust as the rules that govern non-profits.
196. Id. § 102 cmt.
197. See generallyMiriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking
Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85
TULANE L. REV. 983 (2010) (arguing that greenwashing is just rhetoric that is aimed at
improving the company’s image to the public, which could be helpful to corporations,
without actually being a socially responsible company).
198. MODELBENEFITCORP. CODE § 302.
199. See id. § 102 (defining “benefit enforcement proceeding” as a result of either a
failure of a benefit corporation to follow the benefit purpose defined it its articles, or a
violation of the model rules).
200. Id. § 305(c).
201. See id. § 102 (defining “minimum status vote” to include a requirement that any
major change to corporation, including a change in its status, requires a two-thirds vote
from its shareholders).
202. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1020–23 (2013).
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B. Why a Traditional Corporation That Seeks a Stakeholder Theory
Based CSR Program Must Convert to Benefit Corporation Status.
Because Delaware is a state with a Benefit Corporation statute and a
corporation can elect to be governed by either Traditional Corporation
principles or Benefit Corporation principles and not both, a Traditional
Corporation with a shareholder base that supports the stakeholder theory and
has a desire to adopt a CSR program that is not limited by the strictures of
shareholder wealth maximization has no choice but to convert to Benefit
Corporation status. If the board of directors and shareholders of that
Traditional Corporation choose to remain a Traditional Corporation,
however, they cannot pursue a CSR program that conflicts with the
shareholder primacy norm. This conclusion is supported by scholars who
advocate for CSR, where they note that under the American corporate law
system, as embodied by Delaware law with maximization of shareholder
value as the model, CSR must have a strategic financial justification and
must be supported by a business, rather than a moral, case.
203
Assuming that a company’s CSR program is not otherwise unlawful,
requiring Traditional Corporations that reject the shareholder primacy norm
in favor of a stakeholder-based CSR program to convert to a Benefit
Corporation is also good corporate governance. Converting to a Benefit
Corporation requires a supermajority vote of shareholders,
204
a higher
statutory threshold than is required for a merger or other significant corporate
transaction.
205
Only through a referendum of this nature, where shareholders
are directly asked to allow the board of directors to abandon the shareholder
primacy norm and its focus on maximizing shareholder value in favor of
third party interests such that the company will no longer have profit as the
primary objective, can a stakeholder-based CSR program be countenanced
under traditional theories of corporate law.
206
Abandonment of the
shareholder primacy norm is a disenfranchisement of the shareholders’
exclusive rights to the assets of the corporation (subject to any encumbrances
or security interests held by third parties) and should be viewed as a change
in the rights of shareholders no less fundamental than that occasioned by a
merger or sale of all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets. Adoption
of a stakeholder-based CSR program is the functional equivalent of
conversion to Benefit Corporation status.
207
203. See, e.g., Smith & Rönnegard, supra note 157, at 6.
204. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 363 (2015).
205. See id. §§ 251, 271 (requiring only a simple majority vote of shareholders to
approve a merger or the sale of all or substantially all corporate assets).
206. See, e.g., Smith & Rönnegard, supra note 157, at 6.
207. See id.
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V.THE POTENTIAL FORCONFLICTBETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS
ANDCORPORATE SOCIALRESPONSIBILITY PROGRAMS
In many cases, the objectives and implementation of CSR programs result
in social benefits without violations of law (either laws relating to corporate
governance or other laws that may be applicable). A CSR program that
furthers the environmental goals set out in the UNGC by committing a
Traditional Corporation to using renewable energy if such use does not
materially increase expenses or otherwise materially and adversely affect the
financial condition of the company is an example of this. Reducing the use
of fossil fuels is generally in line with local, federal, and international
guidelines and other than an obscure law that might be contorted to apply,
there are no notable laws that prohibit the replacement of fossil fuels with
renewable energy by Traditional Corporations.
208
There are, however, cases where CSR objectives can conflict with laws
that govern the activities of a Traditional Corporation. The obvious example
of this under Traditional Corporation corporate governance law is that of a
CSR program that materially harms shareholder value in order to provide
benefits to non-shareholder stakeholders, where the board would likely be in
breach of its state corporation law duties.
209
Then there are harder cases,
such as when a Traditional Corporation makes business decisions to mollify
political activists and those business decisions have an unknown or
immaterial impact on the value of the corporation. In that scenario, there
likely is no redress for shareholders under state corporation laws.
210
Lost in
the rush to adopt CSR programs, though, are the many other ways that CSR
programs, especially those rooted in international protocols, can
unintentionally violate U.S. federal and local laws, particularly those aimed
208. See, e.g., S.B. 100 (Cal. 2018) (requiring all sources of electricity sold in the state
of California to be sourced 100% from renewable resources); see also H.B. 263, 28th
Leg. (Haw. 2015) (enacting legislation similar to California’s legislation in the state of
Hawaii).
209. See discussion infra Section V.B.i.
210. See, e.g., Austen Hufford et al., Dick’s Sporting Goods Stops Selling Assault-
Style Weapons, Raises Age for Gun Buyers, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/dicks-raises-age-for-gun-buyers-will-stop-selling-assault-
weapons-1519824569 (describing how the sporting goods retailer Dick’s Sporting
Goods Inc. succumbed to political pressure following a school shooting and ended sales
of the most commonly owned sporting rifles and also raised the minimum age for
firearms purchases to twenty-one years of age). Intentionally eliminating sources of
profitable sales is facially antithetical for a Traditional Corporation, but unless the change
has a material and adverse effect on profits over a sustained period it is likely not a breach
of duty for the board of directors to make politically motivated decisions such as the
board of Dick’s made.
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at combatting discrimination.
211
Imagine a CSR program that requires companies to refuse to do business
with any country or state that allows same-sex cohabitation. The originators
of the CSR program in this hypothetical are countries with strong religious
institutions and they seek to impose economic burdens that are intended to
force a change in the policies of those countries that provide equal rights to
homosexuals. Further assume that a CSR advisor with a religious affiliation
adopts the aforementioned CSR program and advises its clients to avoid
doing business with the identified countries and companies that do business
in those countries. If an American real estate leasing company that has
pledged to support CSR initiatives were to follow this CSR program and
refused to lease dwelling units to same-sex couples, would it be in violation
of federal and state anti-discrimination laws
212
or could it claim that because
it was simply following CSR guidelines, its actions cannot be seen as a form
of discrimination?
International guidelines, such as U.N. principles relied upon by European
CSR firms, do not insulate American companies from liability for acts that
violate domestic law unless those guidelines are contained in a treaty that
has been ratified by the Senate in accord with Article II of the Constitution
or approved by Congress and the President in a customary manner.
213
Further, unless the agreement has been ratified by Congress, a state cannot
enter into binding international agreements.
214
While some have argued that
211. See discussion infra Section V.A.
212. See, e.g., Smith v. Avanti, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1202–03 (D. Colo. 2017)
(holding that the property owners violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19,
by discriminating based on sexual orientation); see also Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2019) (citing a California law that prohibits housing
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); N.Y. EXEC. Law § 296 (McKinney
2019) (citing New York’s human rights law that prohibit housing discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation).
213. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; seeOona A. Hathaway, Treaties End: The Past, Present,
and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1321,
1327 (2008) (explaining the difference between a self-executing treaty, which requires
no further action by Congress to be effective as the supreme law of the land, and non-
self-executing treaties, which only become the supreme law of the land if Congress
enacts implementing legislation); id. at 1317 (discussing how, in addition to the process
enumerated in Article II of the Constitution, “congressional-executive agreements,”
which are the result of majority votes by each house of Congress and execution by the
President, are also considered binding international agreements and are treated as the
supreme law of the land pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2); id. at 1286 (clarifying
that, while this may be an accurate statement of how congressional-executive agreements
have been treated, because it is an extra-constitutional custom it can only be
acknowledged as a practice rather than given the full status of Article II treaty
ratification).
214. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see also Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the
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individual states have some level of autonomy with regard to complying with
international law,
215
even under these theories state action that either
frustrates federal foreign policy or conflicts with federal law would
necessarily fail due to the Constitution’s foreign affairs
216
and supremacy
clauses.
217
Thus, in the event of a conflict between foreign or international
standards and laws, on the one hand, and federal or state laws, on the other
hand, the federal and state laws will prevail absent a specific international
agreement on the subject that has been properly enacted and executed under
the Constitution.
A. CSR Programs and General Anti-Discrimination Laws.
There are hundreds of anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. at the federal
and state levels. At the federal level, the earliest significant anti-
discrimination law was the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause,
218
which was supplemented by the Civil Rights Act of 1964
219
and
its progeny, including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 761 (2010) (characterizing Article I, § 10, clause
3 of the U.S. Constitution as a provision that gives Congress a veto power of state
agreements with foreign nations, rather than one that makes such agreements void ab
initio).
215. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control
Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C.L. REV. 457, 475–76 (2004) (arguing that
individual states play an important role in the development of customary international
law and even play a role in executing treaty obligations).
216. See id. at 466–67 (“The United States Supreme Court has often endorsed a
nationalist conception that assumes the exclusion of states from any activities relating to
foreign affairs.”); id. at 467 (“Zschernig, therefore, announced openly what the Court
had only suggested in its previous holdings: not only are Congress and the President
authorized to override state activities that interfere with foreign affairs, but the states are
excluded from any such activities even in the absence of congressional or executive
action.”); see alsoAm. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 429 (2003) (invalidating
a state law that intruded upon the President’s power to conduct foreign affairs).
217. See Jordan J. Paust, Medellín, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant
Executive Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 301, 318–19 (2008) (analyzing
Supreme Court caselaw and concluding that states have no authority to enact laws that
conflict with treaties, and state action must be subordinated to the supreme law of the
land, including duly ratified treaties).
218. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity,
Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for
the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAML. REV. 423, 440 (2002) (tracking
the history of federal anti-discrimination laws starting with the Equal Protection Clause).
219. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. See generally
Paulette Brown, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 92WASH. U.L.REV. 527 (2014) (exploring
the history and legacy of the Civil Rights Act).
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220
the Equal Employment Act of 1972,
221
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978,
222
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
223
and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,
224
among others. These federal anti-discrimination laws
prohibit differential treatment in a wide range of circumstances, including
voting, the application of law and opportunities for and conditions of
employment on the basis of, inter alia, age, race, color, religion, national
origin, and sex.
225
At the state level, all fifty states have enacted some form of anti-
discrimination laws, though some states generally defer to federal anti-
discrimination laws
226
while others aggressively regulate in this field.
227
The
National Council of State Legislatures has reported that on the specific
concern of public accommodation discrimination, forty-five states have laws
prohibiting the practice
228
and all states have laws that prohibit employment
discrimination.
229
In the case of the hypothetical scenario of a boycott aimed at same-sex
cohabitation referenced in the introduction to this section,
230
any company
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2018).
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018).
223. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–03 (2018); see also Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act (ADA Amendments Act) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553.
224. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–96b.
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000. The panoply of protections afforded by federal anti-
discrimination laws is outside the scope of this article.
226. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 25-1-20 to 25-1-40 (2019) (displaying general deference
to federal anti-discrimination laws, despite state law prohibiting employment-related age
discrimination); Robinson v. Alabama Cent. Credit Union, 964 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. 2007)
(adopting federal age discrimination jurisprudence to decide the state age discrimination
claim, despite state having an independent law on the subject matter and acknowledging
the state’s reliance on federal anti-discrimination laws).
227. See, e.g., Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900–96
(West 2019) (prohibiting discrimination in employment and housing); see also Family
Rights Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945.2 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination against
parents seeking to take leave); Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (2016)
(requiring business establishments to provide equal accommodations); The Ralph Civil
Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (2019) (prohibiting hate violence or the threat of hate
violence); Disabled Persons Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 54–55.32 (2017) (prohibiting
discrimination against disabled persons).
228. State Public Accommodations Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 8,
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommoda
tion-laws.aspx.
229. Discrimination — Employment Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 27,
2015) http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/discrimination-employment
.aspx.
230. See supra pp. 352–53.
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that complied with the calls for such a boycott would be in violation of
federal law and any applicable state law on the subject. Using the example
of a large, publicly traded real estate leasing company operating in the U.S.,
if an international CSR organization created a “blacklist” of companies that
leased dwelling units to same-sex couples and foreign companies and
countries refused to deal with all companies included in that blacklist, the
targeted company would not be excused from complying with anti-
discrimination laws. This would be the case even if refusing to comply with
the CSR guideline resulted in material and adverse financial consequences
as CSR compliant companies, investment funds and consumers ceased doing
business with the targeted company. There are simply no financial hardship
exceptions to domestic anti-discrimination laws that would apply in this
scenario.
231
B. CSR Programs and Anti-Discrimination Laws Specifically
Applicable to Boycott Movements.
Of particular interest for the purposes of this article are the anti-boycott
provisions of the federal Export Administration Act
232
and certain anti-
discrimination laws enacted by twenty-seven states in the past several years
(collectively, the “Anti-Boycott Laws”).
233
These laws were enacted to
231. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2018) (stating that, under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, if an employer would suffer “undue hardship” in implementing an
accommodation for an employee the employer may be excused from compliance); id. §
1630.2(p) (stating that an undue hardship requires a showing of a significant difficulty
or expense for the employer, and not allowing a party to engage in discrimination if it is
financially beneficial to the party); id. (implying that the undue hardship exception is
directly related to the types of accommodation an employer may make and establishing
a balancing test for that decision). There are some examples of hardship exemptions from
anti-discrimination laws, but these are generally balancing tests to determine whether
making an accommodation for a particular individual would impose a significant burden
on an employer, landlord, or other party and are not black line tests used to allow
discrimination if the discriminatory act improves the financial condition of the party
discriminating. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002) (“Not every
court has used the same language, but their results are functionally similar. In our
opinion, that practical view of the statute, applied consistently with ordinary summary
judgment principles, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, avoids Barnett’s burden of proof dilemma,
while reconciling the two statutory phrases (‘reasonable accommodation’ and ‘undue
hardship’).”).
232. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4601–23 (2018), repealed in
part by John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 115
P.L. 232, 132 Stat. 1636 § 1766(a).
233. Hannah Allam, U.S. Denies Entry To Leader of Movement to Boycott Israel,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/11/712189791/u-s-
denies-entry-to-leader-of-movement-to-boycott-israel; see also Marc A. Greendorfer,
Boycotting the Boycotters: Turnabout is Fair Play Under the Commerce Clause and the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 29, 30–31 n.1 (2018)
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combat the discriminatory boycott campaign against Israel first launched by
the Arab League and recently assumed by the Boycott, Divestment and
Sanctions (“BDS”) movement
234
(collectively, the “Foreign Boycott
Campaign”).
235
The Anti-Boycott Laws impose penalties ranging from
imprisonment and significant fines for violations of the federal Anti-Boycott
Law
236
to the loss of eligibility to enter into contracts with states and
divestment of state investments in boycott participants for state Anti-Boycott
Laws.
237
In addition to being promoted by groups affiliated with the BDS
movement, elements of the Foreign Boycott Campaign have recently been
adopted by CSR advisors and companies that employ CSR programs.
238
As
a result, the Foreign Boycott Campaign represents the intersection of several
strains of discrimination with CSR.
Since 2010, the U.S. Department of State has utilized a working definition
of anti-Semitism
239
that was recently incorporated into the U.S. Department
of Education’s definition of discrimination
240
for purposes of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (the “Federal Definition of anti-
Semitism”).
241
The Federal Definition of anti-Semitism provides a number
of examples of such discrimination, including “denying the Jewish people
their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of the
[hereinafter Greendorfer, CAMPBELL] (stating a list of state laws).
234. See infra note 236.
235. See Marc A. Greendorfer, The BDS Movement: That Which We Call a Foreign
Boycott, by Any Other Name, is Still Illegal, 22 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 1, 5–40
(2017) [hereinafter Greendorfer, ROGERWILLIAMS].
236. Office of Antiboycott Compliance, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., https://
www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement/oac#penalties (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
237. See Greendorfer, CAMPBELL, supra note 229, at 37 (providing a summary of the
provisions of the state Anti-Boycott Laws).
238. Samantha Marcus, Why Jewish Group Says N.J. Should Dump This Pension
Investment, NJ.COM (Oct. 5, 2017) https://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/
10/pension_investment_violates_anti-israeli_boycott_l.html; see Benjamin Weinthal,
New Jersey Fails to Enforce its Anti-BDS Law with Danish Bank, JERUSALEM POST
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.jpost.com/BDS-THREAT/New-Jersey-fails-to-enforce-
anti-BDS-law-with-Danish-bank-505480 (describing the influence of CSR advisors on
Danske Bank’s boycott of certain companies in Israel).
239. Defining Anti-Semitism, U.S. DEP’T. OF ST. (May 26, 2016), https://www.state
.gov/s/rga/resources/267538.htm.
240. Letter from Kenneth L. Marcus, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to Susan B.
Tuchman, Zionist Organization of America (Aug. 27, 2018), [hereinafter OCR Letter],
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/548748b1e4b083fc03ebf70e/t/5bae6de471c10b08
c080420a/1538158057692/US+Department+of+Education+and+Working+Definition%
5B1%5D+%281%29.pdf.
241. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2018).
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State of Israel is a racist endeavor”, “applying double standards by requiring
of [Israel] a behavior not expected or demanded of by any other democratic
nation” and “holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the State of
Israel.”
242
The Foreign Boycott Campaign is predicated on the claim that Israel is
nothing more than a colonial and racist initiative undertaken by Jews and
explicitly states that the State of Israel is a racist, illegitimate entity that
should not exist.
243
In making the calls to boycott Israel, the Foreign Boycott
Campaign holds academics, entertainers, and businesses in Israel — and
academics, entertainers, and businesses abroad that support Israel —
responsible for the actions of Israel and in selecting objects for the boycott
campaign, applies a unique standard not applied to any other country.
244
The Foreign Boycott Campaign satisfies a number of prongs of the test set
out in the Federal Definition of anti-Semitism and should thus be considered
to be a form of national origin and race discrimination in accord with the
federal government’s longstanding policy.
245
i. CSR Programs That Advance Discriminatory and Unlawful
Initiatives: Two Case Studies.
A recurring theme in CSR ideology is the notion that, in addition to the
benefits to society, the environment and other non-shareholder
constituencies, CSR programs are accretive to the profitability and financial
condition for Traditional Corporations.
246
Because the shareholder primacy
242. See OCR Letter, supra note 236, at 3.
243. See Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, Towards a Global
Movement: A Framework for Today’s Anti-Apartheid Activism, BDS MOVEMENT viii
(June 2007) [hereinafter BDS Manifesto], https://bdsmovement.net/files/bds%20report
%20small.pdf (stating that the BDS Movement’s campaign against Israel is a “struggle
against colonialism, racism, and expulsion.”); id. at 16 (“From their inception, Zionist
thinkers and ideologues propagated the need to cleanse the indigenous [Arab] population
of Palestine if their dream of a Jewish state was to become a reality.”).
244. Id. at 52–53 (calling for a wide range of boycotts against Israel and its
supporters). But see OFFICE OF INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, Defining Anti-Semitism,
https://www.state.gov/defining-anti-semitism/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (noting that
“criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded
as anti-Semitic.”).
245. See OCR Letter, supra note 236, at 2 (stating explicitly that anti-Semitism is a
form of national origin and race discrimination).
246. Porter & Kramer, supra note 127, at 2 (“If, instead, corporations were to analyze
their prospects for social responsibility using the same frameworks that guide their core
business choices, they would discover that CSR can be much more than a cost, a
constraint or a charitable deed — it can be a source of opportunity, innovation and
competitive advantage.”); see also Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon, Does it
Pay to be Really Good? Addressing the Shape of the Relationship Between Social and
Financial Performance, 33 STRATEGICMGMT. J. 1304, 1304–05 (2012) (examining the
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norm is the guiding principle for Traditional Corporations in the U.S., the
financial case for CSR is the only one that can be used to defend the
implementation of any CSR program in this jurisdiction.
Some have argued that a well-designed and implemented CSR program
can mitigate regulatory risks and costs for a Traditional Corporation.
247
McKinsey & Company has studied this issue and concluded that CSR
programs not only can positively impact regulatory settlements, price
premiums, sales, the risk of boycotts, and employee retention, but they also
“can create value in many other ways that support growth, improve returns
on capital, reduce risk, or improve management quality.”
248
But what if a particular CSR initiative, one that purports to promote
laudable goals such as human rights advocacy and that is allowed, or even
encouraged, by foreign governments and non-governmental organizations,
demonstrably creates material financial costs to a Traditional Corporation
with little to no financial benefits?
249
The popularly called BDS movement is a timely case study on this point.
The BDS movement is a recent mutation of the longstanding Arab League’s
effort to harm the State of Israel through economic, academic and cultural
financial impact of CSR programs and finding that while relatively modest CSR
programs do not generally provide material financial benefits, aggressive CSR programs
can provide significant financial benefits); Adriana Galant & Simon Cadez, Corporate
Social Responsibility and Financial Performance Relationship: A Review of
Measurement Approaches, 30 ECON. RES.-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 676, 680–88
(2017) (discussing various ways of measuring the financial impact of CSR programs on
participating companies). But see Gérard Hirigoyen & Thierry Poulain-Rehm,
Relationships Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance:
What is the Causality?, 4 J. BUS. &MGMT. 18, 38 (2014) (arguing that an analysis of the
data show that CSR has a demonstrated negative financial impact on companies); id.
(“This study seems to confirm the Managerial Opportunism Hypothesis identified by
Preston and O’Bannon (1997) which postulates that corporate social responsibility has a
negative influence on financial performance.”).
247. SeeCharles J. Fombrun et al.,Opportunity Platforms and Safety Nets: Corporate
Citizenship and Reputational Risk, 105 BUS. & SOC’YREV. 85, 98 (2000).
248. Sheila Bonini et al., Valuing Social Responsibility Programs, MCKINSEY
QUARTERLY (July 2009), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-
corporate-finance/our-insights/valuing-social-responsibility-programs.
249. See Alexander B. Traum, Applied Anti-Semitism: The BDS Movement and the
Abuse of Corporation Social Responsibility, 34 TOURO L. REV. 1025, 1051–52 (2018)
(“The movement’s boycotts of Israeli academics and artists target those citizens of Israel
who are most amendable to challenging Israel’s current policies vis-a-vis the
Palestinians. By censuring and boycotting such individuals, the BDSmovement alienates
potential allies. Israeli hospitals and medical technology companies serve those suffering
from illness beyond Israel’s borders, including, of course, Palestinians. The BDS
movement’s targeting of these individuals and institutions further reveals the
disingenuousness of the movement’s claim to support peace and prosperity for the
Palestinians.”).
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attacks on Israel and those who are affiliated with Israel.
250
The BDS
movement identifies businesses, entertainers, academics, and others that are
based in or work with Israel as part of a campaign to compel governments,
companies, educational institutions and religious and social groups to either
boycott or otherwise terminate relationships with the Israeli and Israel-
affiliated parties. Though the stated goal of the BDSmovement is to promote
what the Federal Definition of anti-Semitism considers national origin and
racial discrimination,
251
and it has numerous ties to terrorist organizations
that share the goal of destroying Israel,
252
the BDS movement and its
supporters allege that they are a human rights organization devoted to
protesting purported Israeli human rights violations.
253
Using this claim as
250. See MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33961 ARAB LEAGUE
BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33961.pdf; MARTIN A.
WEISS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44281 ISRAEL AND THE BOYCOTT,
DIVESTMENTS, AND SANCTIONS (BDS) MOVEMENT (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mid
east/R44281.pdf. See generally Greendorfer, CAMPBELL, supra note 229. The author of
this paper has published two other law review articles that relate to the legality of the
BDS movement in the U.S.: Marc A. Greendorfer, The Inapplicability of First
Amendment Protections to BDS Movement Boycotts, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. de.novo
112 (2016); Marc A. Greendorfer, Boycotting the Boycotters: Turnabout is Fair Play
Under the Commerce Clause and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 40
CAMPBELL L. REV. 29 (2018). On behalf of Zachor Legal Institute, the author has also
advised governments, companies, individuals and others on legal issues arising out of
BDS activity and has also been instrumental in helping states to enact anti-discrimination
statutes and defending those state laws in federal courts.
251. See Greendorfer, CAMPBELL, supra note 229, at 29–40.
252. Bret Stephens, Opinion, The Anti-Israel Money Trail, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25,
2016, 6:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-anti-israel-money-trail-1461624250
?ns=prod/accounts-wsj; see also STATEOF ISRAELMINISTRYOFSTRATEGICAFF.&DIPL.,
Terrorists in Suits: The Ties Between NGOs Promoting BDS and Terrorist
Organizations, https://4il.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/MSA-Terrorists-In-Suits-
English-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2020); Israel Imperiled: Threats to the Jewish State:
Joint Hearing Before H. Foreign Affairs Comm., Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade and the Subcomm. on the Middle East and North Africa,
114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016) (statement of Jonathan Schanzer, Vice President of
Research Foundation for Defense of Democracies), http://docs.house.gov/meet
ings/FA/FA18/20160419/104817/HHRG-114-FA18-Wstate-SchanzerJ-20160419.pdf
(outlining the ties between supporters of the BDS movement and supporters of
designated foreign terror organizations); Israel, the Palestinians and the United Nations:
Challenges for the New Administration: Hearing Before H. Foreign Affairs Comm.,
Subcomm. on the Middle East and North Africa and Africa, Global Health,Global
Human Rights, and International Organizations, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017)
(statement of Jonathan Schanzer, Senior Vice President for Research, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20170202/105508/
HHRG-115-FA13-Wstate-SchanzerJ-20170202.pdf (stating that the Palestine Liberation
Organization’s treasury is likely the key source of BDS movement funding and that the
Palestine Liberation Organization coordinates BDS activity worldwide).
253. See al-Shabaka, The “S” in BDS: Lessons of the Elbit Systems Campaign, BDS
(Aug. 24, 2016), https://bdsmovement.net/news/%E2%80%9Cs%E2%80%9D-bds-
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cover, BDS activists have promoted their cause as one that properly belongs
within the CSR world and have had success in encouraging governments,
NGOs, CSR advisors and CSR advisory clients to boycott and/or divest from
Israeli businesses and institutions.
254
a) Case Study Number One: Danske Bank.
One example of this campaign has been directed at Elbit Systems Ltd.
(“Elbit”), an international defense electronics company headquartered in
Israel with securities traded on various international exchanges, including in
the U.S. on the Nasdaq StockMarket exchange (“Nasdaq”).
255
Elbit has been
targeted by a number of international BDS affiliates who characterize Elbit’s
activities as being in violation of human rights norms.
256
These groups have
successfully coerced some institutional and sovereign investors to divest
from Elbit’s securities.
257
As a result of BDS affiliates pressuring them, CSR
lessons-elbit-systems-campaign (“For years, Palestinians and their supporters – global
figures such as Desmond Tutu, Adolfo Peres Esquivel, Naomi Klein, and Noam
Chomsky – have called for an immediate and comprehensive military embargo against
Israel to hold it accountable for its violations of Palestinian human rights. Tens of
thousands of people have signed petitions and activists have demonstrated against
companies tied to the Israeli military. For the last decade, activists have run a campaign
against Elbit Systems, one of Israel’s largest military companies. The effort ranges from
governmental lobbying to blockading Elbit subsidiaries in such countries as Australia,
the United Kingdom (UK), and Brazil. A dozen financial institutions, including almost
all major Scandinavian pension funds, are no longer investing in Elbit Systems.”);
Alexander B. Traum, Applied Anti-Semitism: The BDS Movement and the Abuse of
Corporation Social Responsibility, 34 TOURO L. REV. 1025, 1030 (2018) (“The BDS
movement’s purported goals are often presented in cryptic terms, with such ambiguity
serving to obscure the movement’s underlying aim of destroying the State of Israel (as
opposed to positively seeking Palestinian statehood alongside a State of Israel, such
pursuit the so-called ‘two state solutions’).”); see also Benjamin Joffe-Walt, Swedish
Pension Giant Divests from Elbit, JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 31, 2010), https://
www.jpost.com/printarticle.aspx?id=172146 (quoting BDSMovement co-founder Omar
Baghouti on the decision by Swedish pension funds to comply with BDS demands to
divest from Elbit, “This is the beginning of when the BDS movement begins to bite . . .
[t]he BDS movement is turning Israel into the world’s pariah state, as South Africa was
during apartheid.”); Elbit Systems, BDS LIST, http://bdslist.org/security-and-
weapons/elbit-systems/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
254. See Joffe-Walt, supra note 249. See generally NGO MONITOR, DENMARK
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) REPORT (2015), https://ngo-
monitor.org/data/images/File/Denmark.pdf (discussing how NGOs and CSRs are
supporting BDS in Denmark).
255. BDS LIST, supra note 249 (explaining Elbit Systems’ history and business).
256. See id. (explaining how the BDS campaign against Elbit Systems has led
different companies to divest from Elbit Systems due to the company’s human rights
violations).
257. See BenjaminWeinthal, New Jersey Fails to Enforce Anti-BDS Law with Danish
Bank, JERUSALEM POST (Sept. 19, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.jpost.com/BDS-
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advisors such as ISS-Ethix and their clients, such as Danske Bank, include
Elbit on their restricted investment lists and state pension funds in European
countries
258
have included Elbit on their divestment lists as well.
259
Onemust
ask what it is about Elbit that could cause such institutionalized
disapprobation?
In filings made with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), where the U.S. government imposes significant monetary and
criminal penalties for misstatements or omissions,
260
Elbit has described its
operations as
[A]n international high technology company engaged in a wide range of
programs throughout the world. We develop and supply a broad portfolio
of airborne, land and naval systems and products for defense, homeland
security and commercial applications. Our systems and products are
installed on new platforms, and we also perform comprehensive platform
modernization programs. In addition, we provide a range of support
services.
Our major activities include:
• military aircraft and helicopter systems;
THREAT/New-Jersey-fails-to-enforce-anti-BDS-law-with-Danish-bank-505480
(stating that Danske Bank excluded Elbit Systems’ customer’s investments, even though
the bank admits it was not “legally required to divest from any Israeli company”).
258. See Adri Nieuwhof, Scandinavian Financial Institutions Drop Elbit Due to BDS
Pressure, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (Feb. 19, 2010), https://electronicintifada.net/content/
scandinavian-financial-institutions-drop-elbit-due-bds-pressure/8685 (“In early
September, Norway’s Minister of Finance Kristin Halvorsen announced that the
Norwegian State Pension Fund had sold its shares in Elbit, worth $5.4 million . . . .
Following the decision by the Norwegian State Pension Fund, Kommunal
Landspensjonkasse (KLP), one of the largest life insurance companies in Norway, also
divested from Elbit. The move by heavyweights Halvorsen and KLP to divest led
Danwatch, the Danish financial watchdog, to add last month Elbit to its blacklist of 35
companies that are disqualified from investments due to ethical considerations . . . . The
largest bank in Denmark and a leading player in the Scandinavian financial markets,
Danske Bank followed suit a week later.”); see also Impact of the Boycott, Divestment
and Sanctions Movement, Hearing Before H. Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t. Reform,
Subcomm. on Nat’l. Security, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 28, 2015) (statement of Mark
Dubowitz, Executive Director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, documenting
the spread of BDS activity targeting Elbit).
259. A restricted investment list is a generic term for a list of securities that may not
be invested in by institutional or sovereign investment funds. See, e.g., DANSKE BANK
INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS (2019) [hereinafter RESTRICTION LIST], https://danske
bank.com/-/media/danske-bank-com/file-cloud/2019/3/danske-bank---investment-
restrictions-2019.pdf.
260. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019) (providing both a government and private
right of action for any material misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security). See generally Steve Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal
Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2014) (reviewing the criminal
penalties that may be imposed for violations of this rule).
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• commercial aviation systems and aerostructures;
• unmanned aircraft systems and unmanned surface vessels;
• electro-optic and countermeasures systems;
• land vehicle systems;
• command, control, communications, computer and
intelligence (C4I) systems;
• electronic warfare and signal intelligence systems; and
• commercial cyber security products and other commercial
activities.
Many of these major activities have a number of common and related
elements. Therefore, certain of our subsidiaries, divisions or other
operating units often jointly conduct marketing, research and
development, manufacturing, performance of programs, sales and after
sales support among these major activities.
261
If this description sounds like it could be applicable to any other
international high-technology defense company like Lockheed Martin
Corporation or Rockwell Collins, Inc., it is because they are so similar in
what they do as to be named competitors by the Nasdaq.
262
So why have
some countries, CSR advisors, and CSR clients focused on placing Elbit on
their restricted investments lists while ignoring other companies in the same
field? The evidence points to one key difference: it is the only Israeli
company.
263
Some CSR guidelines do, in fact, put high-technology defense companies
on a restricted investments list, but there is a crucial, substantive difference
in those cases. Those CSR programs identify specific activities, such as the
production of nuclear weapons or cluster munitions, as outside of societal
norms, even for defense companies.
264
Robeco Institutional Asset
261. ELBIT SYSTEMS LTD., Annual Report 13 (Form 20-F) (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1027664/000162828018003366/eslt
1231201720-fdoc.htm.
262. Elbit Systems Ltd. Competitors, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/eslt/
competitors (last visited Feb. 8, 2020); see ELBIT SYSTEMS LTD., supra note 257, at 26
(listing as its competitors Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon,
General Dynamics, BAE Systems, Rockwell Collins, L-3 Communications, Thales,
Airbus, Leonardo, Saab, Harris, Textron, FLIR Systems, Orbital ATK, AeroVironment,
Rhode and Schwartz, Rheinmetall, Kongsberg, Safran, CMC, CAE, Aselsan, Bharat
Electronics, Cubic and Verint).
263. Compare About Lockheed Martin, LOCKHEED MARTIN, https://www.lockheed
martin.com/en-us/who-we-are.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (headquartered in
Bethesda, Maryland U.S.A.), and Contact Us, COLLINS AEROSPACE, https://www.rock
wellcollins.com/Contact-Us.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (headquartered inWest Palm
Beach, Florida U.S.A.), with Contact Us, ELBIT SYSTEMS, http://elbitsyst
ems.com/contact-us/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (headquartered in Haifa, Israel).
264. SeeWHITNEYRAUSCHENBACH, GLOBALCLUSTERMUNITIONSLEGISLATION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS 1 (2011), https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/
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Management, an international asset management company, is one such
company with a transparent procedure for adding companies to its restricted
investments list. Under Robeco’s “Exclusion Policy,” companies that are
involved in the production of “controversial weapons,” which include
nuclear weapons, cluster munitions, anti-personal mines, chemical and
biological, and depleted uranium weapons, will not be invested in.
265
In
furtherance of that policy, Robeco lists eleven companies in its Exclusion
Policy.
266
Four companies are listed due to their involvement with the
production of nuclear weapons, three companies are listed due to their
involvement with the production of cluster munitions, another three
companies are listed due to their involvement with the production of depleted
uranium weapons, and one company is listed due to its involvement with the
production of anti-personnel mines.
267
Danske Bank, on the other hand, seems to have had a policy that can
charitably be deemed arbitrary, and possibly be called discriminatory, when
it comes to its defense company restricted investments list. In a document
dated January 2, 2017, based on the recommendations provided by ISS-
Ethix, Danske published its list of companies (“Danske Exclusion List”) that
it will not invest in due to alleged conflicts between Danske’s
“Responsibility” policy (a CSR program that Danske acknowledges is based
on the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investments) and the activities of the
listed companies.
268
Twenty-seven companies, including Elbit, are on this
list.
269
Elbit is included on the list due to its purported involvement “in
supplying electronic equipment in conflict with human rights norms.”
270
When Danske first added Elbit to the Danske Exclusion List in 2010, it
acknowledged that the decision was political and was made because Elbit
worked on Israel’s security wall.
271
This is a rationale for inclusion on the
ef83b474-22c0-4fa4-947b-f287adcf0175 (describing how CSR advisor MSCI evaluates
companies for possible inclusion on restricted investment lists based on their ties to the
manufacture of cluster munitions); see also Aime Williams, Mutual Funds Have
Exposure to Controversial Weapons, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/fcb7e956-0f18-11e7-a88c-50ba212dce4d (noting that as a result of screening for
“controversial weapons” done by CSR firms such asMSCI, the world’s largest sovereign
pension fund will not invest in Boeing or Honeywell, due to those companies’
involvement in the production of nuclear weapons).
265. ROBECO, EXCLUSION POLICY ROBECO (2019), https://www.robeco.com/docm/
docu-exclusion-policy-and-list.pdf.
266. Id. at Annex 2.
267. Id.
268. See RESTRICTION LIST, supra note 255.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See Nicolai Raastrup, Danske Bank Cuts Out Controversial Israeli Companies,
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excluded companies list that is sui generis and is nothing more than a thin
smokescreen for what is likely compliance with the BDS movement’s
boycott list.
272
At the end of 2015, at least 65 countries (including Israel)
had secured border walls, many of them erected in response to terrorism
threats.
273
Elbit is an electronics company that produces systems that can be used by
states to, among other things, defend their borders electronically.
274
According to its latest annual report filed with the SEC, Elbit is active in only
two product lines that can be described as electronic border surveillance
equipment: command, control, communications, computer and intelligence
(“CI”) systems, and electro-optic systems.
275
The particular Elbit product
that has been the focus of attention for CSR purposes is known as
“TORCH,”
276
a system that Elbit provides to other countries, including the
BERLINGSKE (Jan. 25, 2010), https://www.business.dk/finans/danske-bank-frasorterer-
omstridte-israelske-selskaber (translated by author from Dutch to English by Google
translate) (the head of Danske’s CSR program stated “[b]ut our [CSR] policy goes further
than that and incorporates standards prepared by the U.N. and also analyzes the political
context. In the U.N., the EU and in the Nordic region there is an attitude that the
settlements are illegal and an obstacle to a peace solution. On this basis, we can see that
there are violations of our SRI policy.”).
272. See infra notes 272–74 and accompanying text.
273. Simon Tomlinson, World of Walls: How 65 Countries Have Erected Fences on
Their Borders – Four Times as Many as When the Berlin Wall Was Toppled – as
Governments Try to Hold Back the Tide of Migrants, DAILY MAIL, https://www.daily
mail.co.uk/news/article-3205724/How-65-countries-erected-security-walls-
borders.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2015).
274. Numerous other defense companies operate in the “electronic equipment market
segment,” and specifically the “C4I” segment that appears to be the basis for Danske’s
boycott of Elbit. Thales Group, a publicly traded French defense company that Elbit lists
as a competitor. See, e.g., Thales Group, 2017 Registration Document 126 (2017),
https://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/database/document/2018-07/2017_
registration_document%20EN.pdf (acknowledging that Thales operates in the C4I
market and listing Elbit as a competitor in C4I); see also BDS LIST, supra note 251, at
26 (listing Leonardo S.p.A., a publicly traded Italian defense company, as a competitor
of Elbit in C4I); RESTRICTION LIST, supra note 255 (refraining from including Thales
Group or Leonardo from Danske’s Exclusion List).
275. BDS LIST, supra note 251, at 18 (describing C4I systems as “integrated and
coastal border C4I surveillance systems, broadband communication systems, cyber
intelligence solutions, border control systems, ‘safe city’ [integrated communications,
monitoring and intelligence systems within a defined political subdivision] systems,
emergency and first responder communications systems and homeland security and
emergency response training and simulation systems.”); id. at 17 (defining electro-optic
systems as “surveillance systems, ‘safe city’ projects, facility perimeter security
products, electronic fences, fiber optic intrusion detection systems and transportation
protection systems.”). Because of the overlap between the components of C4I systems
and electro-optic systems, this article will use the term C4I to include electro-optic
systems.
276. NORWEGIAN COUNCIL OF ETHICS, RECOMMENDATION TO THE NORWEGIAN
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U.S., for border security.
277
No other company was included in Danske’s Exclusion List on the basis
that it supplies electronic equipment used in border defense (which Danske
inexplicably puts in the same category as nuclear weapons, anti-personnel
mines, and cluster munitions).
278
Indeed, the Norwegian Council on Ethics
explicitly stated that it had made its recommendation to boycott Elbit upon
its consideration of opinions from U.N. related entities that singled out an
Israeli company’s work on Israel’s border wall for scrutiny while ignoring
other non-Israeli companies that had also worked on the border wall.
279
Under the Federal Definition of anti-Semitism, the way Elbit has been held
to a standard not applied to similar companies from other jurisdictions is a
clear case of discrimination.
280
Why did Danske create an exclusion category that is comprised of a single
company that happens to be Israeli for producing a product that is widely
available and only problematic when used in Israel? The answer can be
found at various BDS websites which call for boycotts of Elbit.
281
While
Danske denies participating in BDS, its boycott of Elbit can only be
MINISTRY OF FINANCE 9 (May 15, 2009), https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/
f507de70bf0b4235bf760746452cf192/elbit_engelsk.pdf (recommending divestment
from Elbit for work on Israel’s security wall while acknowledging that many other
companies were involved in the project, including the American company Caterpillar,
which supplied heavy equipment used in construction of the wall).
277. See Jill Aitoro, Elbit Systems of America, CBP in Talks for Expanded
Surveillance Along US-Mexico Border, DEFENSENEWS.COM (Oct. 11, 2017), https://
www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2017/10/11/elbit-systems-of-america-
cbp-in-talks-for-expanded-surveillance-along-us-mexico-border/ (“Elbit Systems of
America, the U.S. subsidiary of Elbit Systems headquartered in Israel, won the contract
from U.S. Customers and Border Protection in 2014 to install a technology-based system
– a combination of towers, sensors, radars, cameras, and communications linked into the
company’s TORCH command and control center for 24/7 surveillance capability.”); see
also Homeland Security, ELBIT SYSS. OF AM., http://www.elbitsystems-us.com/home
land-security (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (describing the TORCH project as a C4I system
built from the ground up that meets real world needs for border security).
278. See RESTRICTION LIST, supra note 255 (listing, in order of frequency used, ten
companies for production of cluster weapons, eight companies for production of nuclear
weapons, four for natural resource violations, two for supplying military equipment used
in conflicts in violations of human rights norms, and one each for violations of
environmental and labor norms); id. (including as one of the ten companies included for
producing cluster weapons Aryt Industries Ltd., an Israeli defense company).
279. NORWEGIAN COUNCIL OF ETHICS, supra note 272, at 9 (recommending
divestment from Elbit for work on Israel’s security wall while acknowledging that many
other companies were involved in the project, including the American company
Caterpillar, which supplied heavy equipment used in construction of the wall).
280. See Defining Anti-Semitism, supra note 235 (defining anti-Semitism as a
perception of Jewish people that is expressed as hatred).
281. See, e.g., al-Shabaka, supra note 249; BDS LIST, supra note 251.
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explained by compliance with the Foreign Boycott Campaign. This
conclusion is further supported by pro-BDS organizations who released
public statements applauding Danske’s adherence to calls to boycott of Elbit
as well as testimony before the U.S. Congress.
282
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that there are only twenty-
seven companies on Danske’s Exclusion List, and somehow companies in
the tiny country of Israel represent 7.5% of the list. Compared to China,
which has two companies on the excluded companies list and Russia, which
has only one company on the list, it defies any rational explanation that Israel
can have two companies on this list. The only explanation is that Danske
has complied with the BDS movement’s Foreign Boycott Campaign against
Elbit.
283
b) Case Study Number Two: Airbnb.
On November 19, 2018, Airbnb, Inc. (“Airbnb”), a Delaware corporation,
released a statement announcing its decision to remove all of its
approximately 200 listings from “Israeli settlements” in the West Bank
region of territories controlled by Israel.
284
Airbnb stated that the territories
in question “are the core of the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians” but
also openly acknowledged that they are “not the experts when it comes to
the historical disputes” in the territories claimed by Israel and the
Palestinians and further acknowledged “conflicting views” on the dispute.
285
Nevertheless, after consulting with “various experts,” Airbnb adopted a
policy to remove Jewish-owned properties in these territories from its listing
platform while leaving properties owned by Palestinian Arabs available.
286
Airbnb stated in its justification for its decision that “as a global
282. See Nieuwhof, supra note 254.
283. Following the intervention of the author of this article in the State of Colorado’s
enforcement of its anti-boycott law, as described in the following subsection, Danske
restructured its Exclusion List and removed Elbit. See DANSKE BANK INVESTMENT
RESTRICTIONS (2018), https://danskebank.com/-/media/danske-bank-com/file-cloud/20
18/3/investment-restrictions.pdf. Danske made no public comments regarding the
removal of Elbit and still maintains on its website its 2017 Exclusion List. See DANSKE
BANK INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS (2017), https://danskebank.com/-/media/danske-bank
-com/file-cloud/2017/2/excluded-companies.pdf. However, the most recent list includes
“controversial weapons” as a category as well as thermal coal and tar sands, and most of
the defense companies on the 2017 list are still listed on the most recent list. A logical
reading of the two lists leads the reader to assume that the more recent list supersedes
and replaces the older list, but Danske has not responded to requests for comment.
284. See Press Release, AIRBNB, Listings in Disputed Regions (Nov. 19, 2018)
[hereinafter Airbnb Disputed Regions], https://press.airbnb.com/listings-in-disputed-
regions/ (giving Airbnb’s statement on Listings in Disputed Regions, published).
285. See id.
286. See id.
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platform . . . we must consider the impact we have and act responsibly.”
287
In furtherance of that policy, Airbnb outlined five points which make up a
“framework for how [Airbnb] should treat listings in occupied territories.”
Two of the most salient points were:
1) Evaluate whether the existence of listings is contributing to existing
human suffering.
2) Determine whether the existence of listings in the occupied territory
has a direct connection to the larger dispute in the region.
288
There is ample evidence that Airbnb’s policy decision regarding Israeli
settlements was the result of a multi-faceted campaign carried out over the
past three years
289
by a BDS movement group known as “StolenHomes.”
290
In 2016, members of this BDS affiliate began a concerted effort to
influence Airbnb by exerting pressure on one of the company’s key investors
and other platforms.
291
The group staged protests outside the San Francisco
office of Fidelity Investments, an Airbnb investor,
292
as well as at its Chicago
office.
293
Concurrently, another BDS affiliate known as “Uplift”
294
targeted
the international subsidiary service of Airbnb in its Dublin, Ireland office.
295
In conjunction with the protests, BDS activists launched a strong online and
written media campaign aimed at raising public awareness of their assault on
Airbnb.
296
Further proof of BDS coordination on the Airbnb campaign is
demonstrated by a letter sent directly by Saeb Erekat, the secretary general
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See StolenHomes.Org Domain Information, WHOIS (last updated Aug. 11, 2018),
https://www.whois.com/whois/stolenhomes.org.
290. See Sonya E. Meyerson-Knox, Breaking: Airbnb Commits to Removing Rentals
in Illegal Israeli Settlements in theWest Bank, JEWISHVOICEFORPEACE (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/airbnb-victory/ (acknowledging the efforts of
StolenHomes as a factor affecting Airbnb’s decision).
291. See id.
292. See Fidelity Tell Airbnb: Stop Profiting From Stolen Homes, CODEPINK,
https://www.codepink.org/protest_airbnb_in_san_francisco (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
293. See Greg Hinz, Airbnb Fight Opens on New Front: West Bank, CHI. TIMES (June
2, 2016), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160602/BLOGS02/160609941/
airbnb-protests-planned-for-chicago-over-rentals-in-israeli-occupied-areas.
294. See UPLIFT, https://uplift.ie/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
295. See Ciaran D’Arcy, Protest at Airbnb Europe HQ in Dublin over West Bank
Rentals, IRISHTIMES (June 3, 2016), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/retail-and-
services/protest-at-airbnb-europe-hq-in-dublin-over-west-bank-rentals-1.2671641.
296. See Stolen Homes by Illegal Settlers, SUMOFUS, http://airbnb.sumofus.org/ (last
visited Feb. 8, 2020); see also Steven Erlanger, West Bank Settlers’ Listings on Airbnb
Draw Palestinian Anger, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/02/08/world/middleeast/airbnb-west-bank-israel-settlements.html.
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of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Executive Committee (a member
of the committee that founded and manages the BDS movement),
297
to
Airbnb’s CEO, Brian Chesky, imploring him to direct Airbnb to terminate
all business with Jewish property owners in the West Bank in early 2016.
298
Just one day after the press release announcing Airbnb’s boycott of Jewish
property owners was published, a joint report by Human Rights Watch and
the Israeli organization KeremNavot on the issue was also published.
299
The
report, which slammed Airbnb for permitting rentals in the West Bank, was
likely intended to lend credence to Airbnb’s claim that its decision had been
taken in accordance with international law and in the pursuance of human
rights.
Airbnb demonstrates double standards by continuing to permit listings in
areas which have long been the subject of territorial dispute or
internationally-recognized occupation such as Chinese-occupied Tibet,
300
Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus,
301
or Moroccan-occupied Western
Sahara.
302
Airbnb continues to allow listings in all of these locations and
offers no explanation as to why listings in the West Bank are any more
directly linked to the “larger dispute” than listings in these locations.
297. See Greendorfer, CAMPBELL, supra note 229, at 48.
298. SeeAdam Chandler, The Bright, Cozy Airbnb Listings in West Bank Settlements,
THEATLANTIC (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/
01/airbnb-israel-west-bank-settlements/424836/?utm_source=SFTwitter.
299. Bed and Breakfast on Stolen Land, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/11/20/bed-and-breakfast-stolen-land/tourist-rental-
listings-west-bank-settlements.
300. Tibetan-style villa, Located in the Barkhor Street Jokhang Temple Edge, Quiet,
Suitable for Family Travel or Friends Go Hand in Hand, AIRBNB, https://www.air
bnb.com/rooms/13446030?location=Tibet%2C%20China&adults=1&guests=1&s=uRh
dMdi8 (last visited Aug. 19, 2019) (describing the apartment location as being in Tibet);
see COUNCIL ON FOREIGNRELATIONS, The Question of Tibet (last updated Dec. 5, 2008),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/question-tibet (noting that the United States has
contradictory policies toward the China-Tibet conflict because the United States
officially recognizes Tibet as a part of China but funded Tibetan independence efforts
during the Cold War).
301. Relaxing Location with Sea Views, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.ca/rooms/
5179967?locAIRBNB tion=Louroujina&s=a91hWubk&guests=1&adults=1 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2020) (describing the apartment location as being in Kirenia, Cyprus); see Cyprus
Country Profile,BBCNEWS (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
17217956 (stating that the island is divided between a Turkish Cypriot and a Greek
Cypriot governments).
302. Cool Appart in Laayoune City, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.ca/rooms/29310
138?location=Western%20Sahara&adults=0&children=0&infants=0&guests=0&s=R7
KBuPRU (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (describing the apartment location as being in
Laayoune, Western Sahara); see Western Sahara Profile, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14115273 (referring to a territorial dispute
between Morocco and Sahara’s indigenous people).
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In the “Further Information” section of its website published after the
original statement, Airbnb cited its current prohibition of listings in Crimea
as evidence that no discriminatory policy vis-à-vis Israel exists.
303
However,
the crucial difference between Israeli settlements and Crimea lies within the
statement itself and should be emphasized: Airbnb is forbidden by U.S.
regulations from operating in Crimea.
304
The boycott of Israeli
developments in the West Bank, by contrast, was a policy decision which
Airbnb was not obliged to implement in compliance with U.S. regulations
and is, in fact, in conflict with longstanding U.S. policies against
participation in foreign boycotts of Israel.
305
The discriminatory nature of
the decision against Israel is accentuated by Airbnb’s own statement which
says: “U.S. law permits companies like Airbnb to engage in business in these
territories” and “[i]n the past, we made clear that we would operate in this
area as allowed by law.”
306
Further, Airbnb stated that it evaluated “whether the existence of listings
is contributing to existing human suffering” and as such, determined the
Israeli settlements needed to be removed.
307
However, Airbnb continues to
allow hosting in a number of areas where human rights violations are rife
such as Tibet, where human rights violations by Chinese forces have been
repeatedly condemned by international bodies in a string of resolutions and
declarations issued by, inter alia, the European Parliament, the U.S. Congress
and the Australian Parliament.
308
Moreover, China’s numerous human rights
violations have been documented and condemned by U.N. human rights
experts.
309
303. See Airbnb Disputed Regions, supra note 280 (“There are conflicting views
regarding whether companies should be doing business in the occupied territories that
are the subject of historical disputes between Israelis and Palestinians . . . . The global
framework will be applied in an ongoing manner. Airbnb has previously removed listings
in Crimea as a result of international sanctions and they are currently not available on
the Airbnb platform.”) (emphasis added).
304. Id.; Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/ukraine.aspx (last visited
Feb. 8, 2020); U.S. DEP’T TREASURY OFFICE FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL,
UKRAINE/RUSSIA-RELATEDSANCTIONSPROGRAM 5, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ukraine.pdf (last updated June 16, 2018).
305. See discussion supra Section V.B.
306. See Airbnb Disputed Regions, supra note 280 (emphasis added).
307. Nora Barrows-Friedman, Airbnb Drops Israel Settlements from Listings,
ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (Nov. 19, 2018), https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/nora-bar
rows-friedman/airbnb-drops-israeli-settlements-listings.
308. See generally INT’L RESOLUTIONS & RECOGNITION ON TIBET (1959–2004),
https://tibet.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/International-rsolutions-on-Tibet.pdf.
309. See, e.g., UN Human Rights Experts to China: Disclose the Fate and
Whereabouts of Kirti Monks, INT’L CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET (June 9, 2011),
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Not only is Airbnb’s policy demonstrative of a double standard, it fails to
demonstrate neutrality in the conflict by allowing Palestinian Arab-owned
rentals in the West Bank to remain on its listing, despite acknowledging that
the area lies “at the core of the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians.”
310
By failing to do so, it has chosen to discriminate against Israelis and favor
Palestinians. Therefore, Airbnb’s boycott is discriminatory. Airbnb’s policy
on “listings in disputed territories” is an Israel-specific policy, strictly
concerning Israel and Jewish landowners.
In the supplementary section of its statement, Airbnb also attempts to
refute claims of discrimination by highlighting the fact that it continues to
allow listings in East Jerusalem and in the Golan Heights, areas which are
considered occupied territories by the international community.
311
However,
the varying degree of implementation of the policy does not detract from the
fact that a specific area and a specific demographic in Israel is being
voluntarily boycotted.
Since Israeli settlements are populated exclusively by Jews, the decision
to remove properties in these areas from Airbnb’s listing service blatantly
discriminates against Jews in violation of Airbnb’s own terms prohibiting
users from assisting or enabling others to “discriminate against or harass
anyone on the basis of race, national origin, religion . . . .”
312
Airbnb’s own
policy regarding settlements has rendered it the chief culprit of violating its
own fundamental principles.
As a result of Airbnb’s discriminatory actions against Jewish property
owners, lawsuits were filed against Airbnb,
313
American politicians
demanded that Airbnb end its discriminatory policy,
314
and several states
with laws regulating BDS activity threatened to take action against
https://www.savetibet.org/un-human-rights-experts-to-china-disclose-the-fate-and-
whereabouts-of-kirti-monks/; INT’LRESOLS. & RECOGNITION ON TIBET, supra note 304.
310. Airbnb Disputed Regions, supra note 280.
311. Id.
312. Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms#sec14 (last updated
Jan. 21, 2019); see also Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy: Our Commitment to
Inclusion and Respect, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.ca/help/article/1405/airbnb-s-
nondiscrimination-policy--our-commitment-to-inclusion-and-respect (last visited Feb.
8, 2020).
313. See, e.g., Jonathan Stempel, Jewish Americans Sue Airbnb Over West Bank
Listing Ban, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbnb-
lawsuit-israel/jewish-americans-sue-airbnb-over-west-bank-listing-ban-
idUSKCN1NX2V1.
314. Adam Kredo, Trump Admin, Congress Slam Airbnb Boycott of Israel as “Anti-
Semitic”, WASH. FREE BEACON (Nov. 28, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://freebeacon.com/
national-security/trump-admin-congress-slam-airbnb-boycott-israel-anti-semitic/print/.
372 AMERICANUNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW Vol. 8:3
Airbnb.
315
In April 2019, the litigation against Airbnb was terminated
pursuant to a settlement agreement that provided, inter alia, for the
termination of the discriminatory policy against Jewish property owners.
316
ii. Case Study Conclusions
While Danske’s and Airbnb’s actions against Israeli businesses present a
concise case study of the intersection of CSR and discriminatory campaigns,
many other companies have complied with the Foreign Boycott Campaign
to harm Israel and Israeli businesses without a direct connection to a CSR
program. As prominent recent examples of companies basing business
decisions on political pressure from the Foreign Boycott Campaign rather
than CSR-related financial considerations, Orange S.A., the French
telecommunications company, echoing the allegations against Israel made
by the BDS movement, undertook a campaign against its Israeli affiliate that
ultimately led to a termination of the business relationship
317
and CRH plc,
an international building materials company, complied with calls from the
BDS movement to end its participation in the Israeli market.
318
The Foreign Boycott Campaign also abuses and misuses standards, such
as those promulgated by ISS-Ethix, that clearly state a company cannot be
found to be violating a human rights norm if a government is the party
allegedly violating a norm and the company is simply a third party
tangentially related to the purported violation.
319
If it is the case that a
company like Elbit is guilty of violating human rights norms simply because
it provided materials and expertise used by Israel in the construction of a
wall near refugee populations, it would also have to be the case that
companies in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and other nearby countries
should also be deemed similarly guilty for the work they do to support
government border security projects, yet no campaign to boycott such
companies is known to exist. This fact highlights the obvious conclusion
315. See, e.g., Reid Wilson, Florida Governor Threatens Airbnb over West Bank
Settlements, THE HILL (Jan. 16, 2019, 11:31 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-
watch/425628-florida-governor-threatens-airbnb-over-west-bank-settlements.
316. See Julia Jacobs, Airbnb Reverses Policy Banning Listings in Israeli Settlements
in West Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/
middleeast/airbnb-israel-west-bank.html.
317. Ali Abunimah, Campaigners Hail “Inspiring” BDS Victory as Orange Quits
Israel, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (Jan. 11, 2016), https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-
abunimah/campaigners-hail-inspiring-bds-victory-orange-quits-israel.
318. John Mulligan, CRH Sells Controversial Stake in Israel’s Only Cement firm
Mashav, IRISH INDEPENDENT (Jan. 8, 2016, 7:53 AM), https://www.independent.ie/
business/crh-sells-controversial-stake-in-israels-only-cement-firm-mashav-
34345981.html.
319. See ISS-ETHIX, supra note 140, at 1 (discussing ISS-Ethix norms standards).
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that the Foreign Boycott Campaign is nothing more than a discriminatory
campaign with a thin veneer of faux human rights activism.
The Danske and Airbnb case studies demonstrate the problems of
discriminatory acts being propagated by CSR campaigns, but Danske and
Airbnb are simply two easily outlined instances of the problem, and Elbit
and Jewish property owners in the West Bank are simply two obvious
examples of Israeli businesses that are being harmed by CSR programs. CSR
programs generally are susceptible to abuse that transforms an otherwise
admirable attempt to provide for a balance between profit and societal needs
into an unlawful and destructive co-option of the corporate franchise. This
is particularly dangerous when the discriminatory campaign hiding behind a
CSR program becomes systemic and institutionalized in government, non-
governmental organization and third-party advisor guidelines that base CSR
principles on purely political platforms.
C. Discriminatory Campaigns Adopted by International
Organizations Do Not Sanitize Unlawful Domestic Discrimination.
At the heart of many CSR campaigns, particularly those adopted by
foreign companies, is some form of international imprimatur. In his role as
the founder of a non-profit legal institute that combats discrimination, the
author of this article has filed governmental complaints against companies
that participate in discriminatory boycotts.
320
The typical scenario in which
such complaints have been filed involves a state with a law that requires state
pension funds to divest from companies that boycott Israel.
321
State laws of
this nature have a form of due process in which companies that have been
identified for divestment are first informed of the determination and then
given an opportunity to dispute the determination.
322
Only after the appeal
process has been completed with a finding that the company has engaged in
the prohibited activity will the divestment occur.
323
A recent interaction between a state regulator and Danske (an interaction
in which the author of this article requested that a state agency enforce the
divestment provisions of the state’s anti-discrimination law) is illustrative of
320. Letter from Zachor Legal Institute to California Public Employees’ Retirement
System (May 17, 2018) (on file with author); Letter from Zachor Legal Institute to SEC
(Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-18/s71818-4699792-176
614.pdf.
321. See supra Section V.B.i.
322. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 215.4725(3)(a) (2018) (outlining the required steps the
state fund must take to engage with a company identified as engaging in prohibited
boycott activity and providing such company with a 90 day window to demonstrate that
it is not engaging in the prohibited activity).
323. See id.
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how discriminatory campaigns can infect CSR with the support of CSR
adherents. In late 2017, the State of Colorado Public Employee Retirement
Association (“PERA”) notified Danske that it was in violation of Colorado’s
anti-boycott law (the “COBDS Law”)
324
and would be subject to divestment.
Through its counsel, Danske acknowledged that under the Danske Exclusion
Policy it boycotts two Israeli companies (Elbit and Aryt Industries Ltd.), but
claimed that the exclusion was not a boycott as that term is defined in the
CO BDS Law.
325
To argue this, Danske parsed the text of the CO BDS Law
to opine that a prohibited boycott has to have a politically motivated intent
to inflict harm on Israel.
326
Danske stated that its boycott of Elbit was not
politically motivated to inflict harm on Israel but was, instead, part of its
CSR program and pointed to the fact that it was simply complying with its
own “Responsible Investing”
327
policies, which in turn were developed on
the basis of the UNGC and U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights with the advice and counsel of MSCI and ISS-Ethix,
328
and thus had
no political motivation to harm Israel.
329
Responding to that argument, the author of this article reminded PERA
that compliance with international CSR guidelines does not absolve a
company of liability for violating valid laws of the U.S. and individual states:
The [CO BDS Law] does not contain exemptions for boycotts that have
been undertaken as part of a company’s voluntary compliance with the
guidance of an international political organization. As an initial matter,
the international organization that has issued the standards Danske
324. COL. REV. STAT. §§ 24-54.8-201 to 24-54.8-204 (2018).
325. See JTA, New Jersey Divests from Danish Bank to Comply with State Anti-BDS
Law, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Jan. 14, 2018, 11:23 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/new-
jersey-divests-from-danish-bank-to-comply-with-state-anti-bds-law/ (discussing how
Danske Bank denies that its exclusion policy, which prevents it from doing business with
Israeli companies Aryt Industries and Elbit System, constitutes a boycott).
326. See COL. REV. STAT. § 24-54.8-201 (looking to the definition of economic
prohibitions against Israel, which means “engaging in actions that are politically
motivated and are intended to penalize, inflict economic harm . . . .”).
327. Sustainable Investment Policy, DANSKE BANK, https://www.danskeinvest.dk/w/
show_download.hent_fra_arkiv?p_vId=didken_responsible_investment_policy_dima.p
df (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
328. Letter from Charles E. Borden, Allen & Overy LLP, to Jennifer Schreck, Senior
Staff Attorney, PERA (Oct. 10, 2017) (on file with author)[hereinafter Borden Letter].
329. See Benjamin Weinthal, Colorado Sanctions Danish Bank for BDS Activity
Against Israel Companies, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES (Sept. 26,
2017), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2017/09/26/colorado-sanctions-danish-bank-for-
bds-activity-against-israel-companies/ (stating that Danske’s head of responsible
investments said “Danske Bank does not boycott Israel or Israeli companies as such, and
we do not take part in this so-called BDS campaign targeting Israel.”). Danske used the
UNGP to explain its actions when the UNGP states that its principles should not be
applied in a discriminatory manner. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
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complies with [the U.N.] is notoriously anti-Israel. Danske chooses to
comply with the standards promulgated by this biased entity. There is
certainly no binding authority under which Danske is forced to comply
with the UN standards in the manner it has and no law otherwise obligates
Danske to boycott the two Israeli companies. In fact, the international
standards are a political message that Danske has volitionally adopted and
complied with.
330
Particularly problematic is when CSR guidelines are based on U.N.
actions or determinations. U.N. biases, especially against Israel, are well
documented.
331
In 2017, all 100 U.S. Senators called for the U.N. to
eliminate its bias against Israel.
332
The fact that any topic was able to get
bipartisan, unanimous support of the Senate is strong evidence of the
pervasiveness of U.N. bias. Further, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and
U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Nikki Haley, in announcing the
withdrawal of the U.S. from the U.N. Human Rights Council, highlighted
the organization’s lengthy and deep bias against Israel and stated:
[T]he council’s continued and well-documented bias against Israel is
unconscionable. Since its creation, the council has adopted more
resolutions condemning Israel than against the rest of the world
combined . . . . Last year, the United States made it clear that we would
not accept the continued existence of agenda item seven, which singles
out Israel in a way that no other country is singled out. Earlier this year,
as it has in previous years, the Human Rights Council passed five
resolutions against Israel – more than the number passed against North
Korea, Iran, and Syria combined. This disproportionate focus and
unending hostility towards Israel is clear proof that the council is
motivated by political bias, not by human rights.
333
What this documented bias against Israel by the U.N. and its affiliated
agencies demonstrates is the risk of international guidelines being
weaponized and deployed as CSR programs. Foes of Israel have pushed the
Foreign Boycott Campaign not only at the local level, but by infiltrating U.N.
agencies that publish standards used as a benchmark to set CSR policies,
these groups have been able to create a de facto international boycott
330. Borden Letter, supra note 324.
331. See infra notes 322–323 and accompanying text; see also S.C. Res. 2334, ¶¶ 1–
9 (Dec. 23, 2016) (showing the U.N.’s bias against Israel by condemning Israel).
332. See Letter from the U.S. Senate to António Guterres, Secretary-General of the
United Nations (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/
f6c7c142-8655-4c34-907b-ffe91b033f34/83A98BDD8379F7A35D6207DCB0D74
B38.4-27-2017-rubio-coons-ltr-to-unsg-re-israel.pdf.
333. Mike Pompeo, Sec’y of State, & Nikki Haley, U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, Remarks on the U.N. Human Rights Council (June 19, 2018)
(transcript available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/06/283341.htm).
376 AMERICANUNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW Vol. 8:3
campaign directed at Israel. Put another way, CSR is being used, in part, to
sanitize discrimination.
As noted in the previous section of this article, the U.S. Department of
State further defines anti-Semitism as, inter alia, “[d]enying the Jewish
people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence
of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor,” “[a]pplying double standards by
requiring of it a behavior not expected of or demanded of any other
democratic nation” and “[h]olding Jews collectively responsible for actions
of the State of Israel.”
334
The U.S. Department of Education’s Office for
Civil Rights has adopted the Department of State’s definition of anti-
Semitism and is applying it in a civil rights complaint against Rutgers
University.
335
By their own admission, Danske, and other companies and European
bodies issuing CSR guidelines, brand Israel as a racist endeavor,
336
hold
Israeli companies to a double standard and hold Jews, including Jewish-
controlled companies, collectively responsible for the acts of the State of
Israel. As such, these entities discriminate on the basis of national origin and
race.
337
To be certain, Danske is hardly the only company that has incorporated
discriminatory CSR guidelines into its own activities, but it is a very telling
example of how CSR is used as a trojan horse to carry BDS into Traditional
Corporations. Danske’s advisors, ISS-Ethix and MSCI, each having
thousands of clients relying on them for CSR guidance, presumably advise
all of their CSR customers in a manner consistent with how it advised
Danske on investing in Israeli companies, so the scope of unlawful
334. Defining Anti-Semitism, supra note 235.
335. OCR Letter, supra note 238, at 3.
336. See NGO MONITOR, supra note 250, at 2 (“Ultimately Danske Bank and Ethix
rely on distorted legal narratives that falsely accuse Israel of human rights violations and
erroneously argue that conducting business with Israel amounts to furthering these
alleged violations. As part of this anti-Israeli narrative, they promote the claim that it is
illegal and unethical to conduct business with Jews over the 1949 armistice lines. Courts
in France, Canada, and the UK have explicitly found that there is no international law
prohibiting business operations over the 1949 armistice lines. A court in France and the
advertising board in the Netherlands also found that it was defamatory to claim a
company selling goods or operating over armistice lines was acting “illegally” or in
violation of international law.”).
337. See OCR Letter, supra note 238, at 2 (“However, as OCR has repeatedly
indicated previously, discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived shared ancestry
or ethnic characteristics — which may include discrimination against Jewish or Muslim
students — is discrimination on the basis of national origin or race in violation of Title
VI. In determining whether students face discrimination on the basis of actual or
perceived Jewish ancestry, we rely where appropriate upon widely established
definitions of anti-Semitism.”).
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discrimination in companies with CSR policies is likely significant.
Moreover, a Traditional Corporation that incorporates BDS principles in
its CSR policies is also acting in violation of the Shareholder Primacy Norm.
While CSR advocates argue that CSR programs ultimately lead to increased
shareholder value, these claims are vague and speculative. In fact, Professor
Stephen Bainbridge examined the question of how the adoption of BDS
affects investment performance and concluded that it is “nearly certain to
result in poorer performance” of investment plans.
338
To this point, Israel
has been named “Startup Nation” in response to its prolific entrepreneurial
nature
339
and in a research paper distributed in 2018 by Jeffries LLC, Israel’s
technology sector was described as one of the top ten most technologically
advanced countries in the world.
340
Only the U.S. and China have more
companies listed on Nasdaq.
341
Adopting an investing program that prohibits
investments in one of the world’s leading investment markets
342
is clearly at
338. Stephen Bainbridge, Did Harvard Divest From Israel?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Aug. 15, 2010), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2010/08/did-harvard-divest-from-israel.html; see also Stephen
Bainbridge, Those Divesting Presbyterians, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 21,
2004), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2004/07/those-di
vesting-presbyterians.html.
339. See generally DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION: THE STORY OF
ISRAEL’S ECONOMICMIRACLE (2011).
340. THE ISRAELI TECHNOLOGY IMPERATIVE: INVESTING AT THE CROSSROADS OF
INNOVATION, BLUESTAR INDEXES (June 2018), https://www.fa-mag.com/userfiles/
stories/whitepapers/2018/The-Israeli-Technology-Imperative-June_2018-sm.pdf; see
also Israel’s Technology Sector Continues to Grow, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 9, 2018),
http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/1796420563/israels-technology-sector-continues-
to-grow/2018-02-09 (“Israel is riding on a global surge in high-tech investment. In the
U.S., venture-capital firms deployed US$84bn in more than 8,000 companies in 2017,
the highest number since the dot.com era around 2000 . . . .”); Sam Shead, The 25
Coolest Tech Companies in Israel, BUS. INSIDER (May 25, 2017, 3:30 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/coolest-tech-startups-in-israel-2017-5 (“Israel
continues to produce an impressive number of highly successful tech companies for a
country with a population of just 9 million people. The Middle Eastern country is
sometimes referred to as ‘Startup Nation’ thanks to the sheer number of entrepreneurs
building businesses there, particularly in cities like Tel Aviv. Multinational tech
companies like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft all have research centres in
Israel . . . .”).
341. Rory Cellan-Jones, Next Silicon Valleys: What Makes Israel a Start-Up Nation,
BBCNEWS (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26071818.
342. Coco Liu, Why Israel is the Next Promised Land for Chinese Investors, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 26, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://www.scmp.com/week-
asia/business/article/2121498/why-israel-new-promised-land-chinese-investors
(“China’s total investment in Israel almost tripled last year to US$16 billion (HK$125
million), largely driven by a surge in funding in Israel’s hi-tech industry . . . .”); see also
Steven Scheer,U.S. Intel Plans $5 Billion Investment in Israeli Plant, REUTERS (Feb. 21,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-intel-israel-expansion/u-s-intel-plans-5-
billion-investment-in-israeli-plant-minister-idUSKCN1G51ET; PWC ISRAEL HI-TECH
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odds with the fiduciary duties of any Traditional Corporation’s board of
directors, yet this is exactly what happens when a board signs on to a CSR
program with BDS elements. In addition, in a jurisdiction that has enacted
legislation that prohibits the state from entering into contracts with, or
investing in, companies that boycott Israel, the financial cost of adopting any
form of BDS program can be significant.
343
Under accepted shareholder primacy theories, whether radical or
traditional, directors ultimately have a duty to enhance the value of the
company. Adhering to a CSR policy that includes BDS elements turns the
corporation from one that is primarily focused on enhancing shareholder
returns to one that is acting for a political or social constituency, something
that is not permissible for a non-benefit corporation. The boycotting of
Israeli companies can only provide “social justice” returns (that is,
appeasement of a radical base), something at odds with traditional notions of
Shareholder Primacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
CSR programs can be both legal and beneficial, but they are not immune
from the application of federal and state laws. As CSR has become an
important element considered by the boards of Traditional Corporations it
has also caught the attention of groups that see the opportunities to embed
EXIT REPORT 2017 1 (2018), https://www.pwc.com/il/en/assets/pdf-files/exit-report-en-
2017.pdf (noting that 2017 merger and acquisition deal value for Israeli companies was
up 110% over 2016, with a total value of $23.8 billion, and concluding “ . . . one should
not overlook the fact that more global corporations now choose Israel as the place where
they can buy the right technologies to help them shape their own future.”).
343. BDS activists have targeted a number of large, publicly traded corporations with
demands that they terminate business relationships with Israel. See Global BDS Week of
Action Against HP November 25 - December 3, BDS MOVEMENT, https://bds
movement.net/boycott-hp/week-of-action (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). As an example, the
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company has been a frequent focus for BDS activists.
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company also has a number of contracts with states,
including the State of California. See LPA Contract Detail, CA.ORG, https://cale
procure.ca.gov/PSRelay/ZZ_PO.ZZ_CTR_SUP_CMP.GBL?Page=ZZ_CTR_SUP_PG
&Action=U&SETID=STATE&CNTRCT_ID=3-16-70-3223A (last visited Feb. 8,
2020). The State of California prohibits state agencies from entering into contracts with
entities boycotting Israel and if Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company were to participate
in BDS boycotts of Israel, they would be disqualified from entering into contracts with
the State of California (as well as other states with anti-BDS laws). See CAL. PUB. CONT.
CODE § 2010 (West 2017). As the State of California has an economy that would be the
fifth largest in the world if it were an independent country, a company like Hewlett
Packard Enterprise Company would be excluded from participating in a trillion dollar
economy if it became a BDS participant. See Lisa Marie Segarra, California’s Economy
Is Now Bigger Than All of the U.K., FORTUNE (May 5, 2018), https://fortune.com
/2018/05/05/california-fifth-biggest-economy-passes-united-kingdom/.
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their own agendas into the boardroom. The most relevant current example
is that of CSR being used by BDS activists to co-opt the corporate franchise
into becoming yet another tool to further the discriminatory BDS movement.
When CSR is implemented in such a manner it becomes an unlawful form
of national origin and race discrimination. Furthermore, abuse of CSR in
this way leaves the boards of Traditional Corporations in violation of state
corporate law principles on shareholder primacy and the obligation of
corporate boards to maximize the value of the company. In addition to
shareholder liability, companies that adopt discriminatory CSR programs
should be exposed to liability under anti-discrimination laws and should also
be subject to shareholder lawsuits based on breach of fiduciary duty under
relevant state laws.
To the extent a Traditional Corporation adopts a CSR program that
benefits non-shareholder parties and is not facially discriminatory, to avoid
shareholder lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty the company should
convert to a Benefit Corporation status, which would subject the matter to a
vote of all shareholders and require the company to be transparent as to its
decision to focus on social and political matters, rather than profit.
